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Abstract
This Article considers the European Community (“Community” or “EC”) antitrust law rules
on the duty to supply competitors with important goods or services. It is convenient to begin,
in Part I of this Article, by summarizing the relevant Treaty provisions, and the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (the “Court”) and the Commission of the European
Communities (the “Commission”) on essential facilities. Part I begins with the less specialized
cases, and outlines the Court and Commission cases on telecommunications and performing rights
societies, as well as some relevant Community legislation. This provides the basis for a discussion
of the general principles and problems in Part II of this Article. Part II is a synthesis, based on
the principle that a dominant company has, at least in some cases, a duty to supply, if refusal will
cause a significant effect on competition.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the European Community ("Commu-
nity" or "EC") antitrust law rules on the duty to supply competi-
tors with important goods or services. In general, competition
law discourages competitors from cooperating with one another.
However, if one competitor owns something, if access is essential
to enable other competitors to do business, and if the competi-
tors cannot be expected to provide this facility for themselves,
then European Union ("EU") competition law obliges the owner
of the essential facility to give equal access to its competitors.
This obligation is due to the effect of a refusal of access on com-
petition. This principle must be treated with caution, because
the law normally allows a company to retain, for its own exclusive
use, all advantages that it has legitimately acquired. Further-
more, companies are normally free to improve the bargains that
they offer to customers by offering related goods or services as
part of the bargain, even if this makes it difficult or even impossi-
ble for their competitors to offer comparable bargains. All the
same, the principle that companies in dominant positions have a
legal duty to provide access to genuinely essential facilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis is one of great and increasing impor-
tance in telecommunications, transmission of energy, transport,
and many other industries. It is often the principal or most cru-
1994]
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cial legal problem that arises after an industry is deregulated, but
can arise in any industry.
These rules apply both to state-owned and to private enter-
prises. They may be especially important if a company has been
given a privileged position by a state, such as control over an
essential facility - for example, an airport or a harbor. Where
the parent companies of a joint venture have considerable mar-
ket power, they may be required under Article 85(3) of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community' (the "EC
Treaty") to not discriminate in favor of theirjoint venture and to
deal with its competitors on the same basis, even if it is not
strictly essential for competitors to contract with them, and even
if neither competitor is dominant. A dominant company that
discriminates selectively against a particular competitor - for
example, to discourage it from overly vigorous competition by
denying access to an important facility on the same terms as it
gives to other companies - is likely to break the law, even if the
facility is not necessarily "essential."
If a dominant company owns intellectual property rights
that enable it to prevent competitors from producing directly
competing products, it is not necessarily an abuse for it to refuse
to grant licenses to its competitors. Licenses may be necessary to
give access to an essential facility, but only if unlicensed competi-
tors cannot enter the market. Otherwise, refusal to license in-
fringes Article 86 of the EC Treaty2 only if there is some related
behavior that constitutes an abuse, whether exploitative or exclu-
sionary. In some cases, compulsory licensing of the intellectual
property rights is the appropriate remedy.
It is convenient to begin, in Part I of this Article, by summa-
rizing the relevant Treaty provisions, and the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (the "Court")
and the Commission of the European Communities (the "Com-
mission") on essential facilities. Part I begins with the less spe-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 85(3), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 627 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATiEs ES-rABLiSH NG THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
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cialized cases, and outlines the Court and Commission cases on
telecommunications and performing rights societies, as well as
some relevant Community legislation. This provides the basis
for a discussion of the general principles and problems in Part H
of this Article.
I. TREATY PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW OF THE COURT
OF JUSTICE AND THE COMMISSION
What are essentially issues of access to essential facilities
have arisen frequently in Europe in connection with the liberali-
zation of the gas, electricity, and telecommunications industries.
The Commission determined, however, that these industries
could not be satisfactorily liberalized using only Community anti-
trust law, and that it was necessary to adopt general measures of
which access to networks and grids would be only one aspect.
The case law, briefly summarized below, makes it clear that
there is a duty to supply both competitors and customers in a
variety of circumstances. The case law uses a number of legal
principles or theories, more or less explicitly: a) dominant com-
panies may not discriminate if the discrimination has significant
effects on competition; "b) dominant companies may not refuse
to supply competitors or customers if the refusal has significant
effects on competition; c) dominant companies may not in-
crease or extend their dominance in the same markets or use
their power in one market to monopolize another; d) an "essen-
tial facility" principle; e) dominant owners of intellectual prop-
erty rights commit an abuse only if they do something more than
merely exercise those rights to prevent the monopoly given to
them from being infringed; f) dominant companies may not se-
lectively treat customers or competitors with which they deal less
favorably to discourage or penalize competition; g) dominant
companies may not make their willingness to supply conditional
on acceptance of restrictive undertakings. These principles are
not, of course, mutually exclusive.'
3. This Article deliberately disregards formal legal categories such as refusal to
deal, discrimination, etc. Instead, it calls attention to the economic aspects of the cases
and situations described. This Article is based on the case law and practice of the EC
institutions to date. Almost all of the cases that have been dealt with have been treated
in a relatively straightforward manner, and no effort is made to provide a more sophisti-
cated economic analysis. If the defendant companies had thought it appropriate to
1994]
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A. Treaty Provisions
Article 86 of the EC Treaty. states that an abuse of a domi-
nant position may consist of, among other things, "applying dis-
similar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. ' 4
This prohibits second line discrimination between competitors
downstream from the market in which the dominant position
exists, placing one or more of the competitors at a disadvantage
vis-d-vis the others. It applies whether or not the favored com-
petitors are associated with the dominant company, but it does
not impose a duty to supply on a nondiscriminatory basis regard-
less of the effect on competition.
The Court has confirmed that Article 86 also prohibits dis-
crimination between customers of the dominant company based
on whether or not they deal exclusively with it.' This behavior
creates a competitive disadvantage for competitors of the domi-
nant company at the same level in the market. It is not within
the narrow phrase just quoted, "placing them at a competitive
disadvantage."6 An unjustified refusal to deal is, of course, an
make more sophisticated economic arguments, there would be more practice to show
how the Commission would deal with them.
4. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86. The full text of Article 86 of the EC Treaty
states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between mem-
ber-States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the preju-
dice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligation which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
Id.
5. Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-48,
50, 54-56, 111, 113-14/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, 2002-05, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295, 471-73;
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 461-64,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 211-15.
6. See supra note 4 (quoting Article 86 of EC Treaty).
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extreme form of illegal discrimination.7
Article 86 also prohibits dominant companies from "tying-
in," defined as "making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts."' "Tying-in" is
normally practiced by horizontally-integrated companies selling
different products to customers at the same level of industry or
distribution. It is, in essence, an attempt by a company domi-
nant in the market for one type of good to use its position in that
market to strengthen its position in the market for other goods.
Article 66(7) of the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty9 ("ECSC Treaty") prohibits abuses of a dominant position
by dominant coal and steel companies, but it does so in general
terms. Article 63 of the ECSC Treaty allows the Commission to
take action if "discrimination is being systematically practiced by
buyers, particularly as concerns orders placed by government
subsidiaries. " 1° This was primarily intended to allow the Com-
mission to prevent non-ECSC companies from discriminating in
favor of coal and steel producers of their own nationality. It was,
in effect, a special case of what later became Article 90 of the
EEC Treaty." Under Article 63 of the ECSC Treaty12 it is not
7. The Court has not yet had an opportunity to consider the duties of a dominant
company that has never supplied the goods or services in question to anyone outside its
own group.
8. See supra note 4 (quoting Article 86 of EC Treaty).
9. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art.
66(7), 261 U.N.T.S. 140,203-05 (1957), as amended in TREAT=S ESTABUSHING THE EuRo-
PE'N COMMuNrrms (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. Article 66(7)
of the ECSC Treaty says:
To the extent necessary, the High Authority is empowered to address to public
or private enterprises which, in law or in fact, have or acquire on the market
for one of the products subject to its jurisdiction a dominant position which
protects them from effective competition in a substantial part of the common
market, any recommendations required to prevent the use of such position for
purposes contrary to those of the present Treaty. If such recommendations
are not fulfilled satisfactorily within a reasonable period, the High Authority
will, by decisions taken in consultation with the interested government and
under the sanctions provided for in Articles 58, 59 and 64, fix the prices and
conditions of sale to be applied by the enterprise in question, or establish
manufacturing or delivery programs to be executed by it.
Id.
10. Id. art. 63.
11. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90. Article 90 of the EEC Treaty said:
1. In the case of public enterprises and enterprises to which Member States
1994]
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necessary to prove dominance or an effect on trade between
Member States.
B. The Case Law of the Court
1. Commercial Solvents v. Commission
The leading case in this area is Commercial Solvents,"5 in
which the Court held that the company had a dominant position
for the production of a raw material used to produce a chemical
because the company had a world monopoly. The abuse was the
refusal to supply a downstream competitor, which Commercial
Solvents had previously tried to acquire, with the raw material
which it needed. The Court ruled that a dominant company's
plans to begin producing the downstream product itself did not
justify its refusal to supply the raw material to its competitor and
former customer when the refusal would eliminate the competi-
tor from the market. The Court confirmed the Commission's
order to resume supplies. In its judgment, the Court said:
[A]n undertaking being in a dominant position as regards
the production of raw material and therefore able to control
the supply to manufacturers of derivatives cannot, just be-
cause it decides to start manufacturing these derivatives (in
competition with its former customers), act in such a way as
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor main-
tain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and in Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on com-
petition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the per-
formance in law or in fact, of the specific tasks assigned to such them. The
development of trade may not be affected to such an extent as would be con-
trary to the interests of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Arti-
cle and shall, where necessary, issue appropriate directives or decisions to
Member States.
Id.
12. ECSC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 63.
13. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 6-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309; see Commis-
sion Decision No. 87/500/EEC, O.J. L 286/36 (1987) [hereinafter BBI/Boosey &
Hawkes]; Gregory B. Adams, Antitrust Constraints on Single-Firm Refusals to Deal by Monopo-
lists in the European Economic Community and the United States, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
Adams correctly points out that the Court's approach in Commercial Solvents resembled a
rule of reason analysis and says that "the legal issue of whether full forward integration
may be justified by efficiency considerations ... remained open." Id. at 15.
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to eliminate their competition which, in the case in question,
would have amounted to eliminating one of the principal
manufacturers of ethambutol in the Common Market. Since
such conduct is contrary to the objectives expressed in Article
3(f) of the Treaty and set out in greater detail in Articles 85
and 86, it follows that an undertaking which has a dominant
position in the market in raw materials and which, with the
object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its
own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a
manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks elimi-
nating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing
its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86.1'
This passage from the judgment indicates that, at least when
the three stated conditions are fulfilled, there is a general rule
that a dominant company may not refuse to supply a competitor
if the effect would be to put the competitor out of business, even
if it plans to use the products in question itself.
It is notable that Commercial Solvents is often cited by the
Court, the Court of First Instance (the "Tribunal"), and the
Commission, and is clearly regarded as an important case stating
a broad principle. After Commercial Solvents'5  and United
Brands,16 the first two important cases on Article 86, the princi-
ple of a general duty of dominant companies to supply was so
well-established that it was not necessary later to distinguish es-
sential facility cases from other cases of exclusionary abuse.1
7
14. Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R at 250-51, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 340-41. In
argument the Commission said there is a duty to supply at least when: the dominant
company is a monopoly; the refusal affects one of the principal users, a former cus-
tomer; no objective justification is apparent; and the refusal gravely affects the condi-
tions of competition in the EC. If there is a duty to supply, there is, under Article 86
itself, a duty not to discriminate if the buyers are in competition with one another.
Some points to note include that the case involved a refusal to supply a down-
stream competitor, with important effects on competition. Specifically, the customer
was the only competitor of Commercial Solvents in the Community in the production
of the downstream product. Id. at 235, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327-28. Commercial Sol-
vents was easily able to supply the competitor's needs as it had spare capacity and did
not need all its production for its own use. Id. at 251, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 341. Fur-
thermore, no other justification for the refusal to supply was suggested.
15. Id. at 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R at 309.
16. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1
G.M.L.R. 429.
17. John Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Law, Pres-
ent and Future: Some Aspects, in FiFrH ANN. FoRDHAm CoRP. L. INST. CoNF. 25, 57 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1979) (unpublished conference paper, on file with Fordham Corporate Law
Institute) [hereinafter Abuse of Dominant Positions].
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What the Commission now calls essential facility cases were sim-
ply merged with what was regarded as the general class of cases
in which dominant companies have a duty to supply, and it was
not thought necessary even to distinguish between supply to
competitors and customers not in competition with the domi-
nant supplier.
2. United Brands
In the United Brands case, United Brands had refused to sup-
ply Olesen, a distributor, because Olesen had taken an active
part in a sales campaign for a competing brand of bananas. a8
The Court stated that:
an undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of
marketing a product - which cashes in on the reputation of
a brand name known to and valued by the consumers - can-
not stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by
regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by that cus-
tomer are in no way out of the ordinary.' 9
It was therefore necessary to see if the discontinuance was justi-
fied. In doing so, the Court stated:
Although ... the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant
position cannot disentitle it from protecting its own commer-
cial interests if they are attacked, and that such an undertak-
ing must be conceded the right to take such reasonable steps
as it deems appropriate to protect its said interests, such be-
havior cannot be countenanced if its actual purpose is to
strengthen this dominant position and abuse it.
Even if the possibility of a counter-attack is acceptable that
attack must still be proportionate to the threat taking into
account the economic strength of the undertakings con-
fronting each other.
The sanction consisting of a refusal to supply by an undertak-
ing in a dominant position was in excess of what might, if
such a situation were to arise, reasonably be contemplated as
a sanction for conduct similar to that for which UBC blamed
Olesen.
In fact UBC could not be unaware of that fact that by acting
18. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R at 217, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 435; see Adams, supra
note 13, at 29-31 (noting that test of anticompetitive purpose is essence ofjudgment).
19. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 292, 1 182, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R1 at 496.
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in this way it would discourage its other ripener/distributors
from supporting the advertising of other brand names and
that the deterrent effect of the sanction imposed upon one of
them would make its position of strength on the relevant mar-
ket that much more effective.
Such a course of conduct amounts therefore to a serious in-
terference with the independence of small and medium sized
firms in their commercial relations with the undertaking in a
dominant position and this independence implies the right
to give preference to competitors' goods.
In this case the adoption of such a course of conduct is
designed to have a serious adverse effect on competition on
the relevant banana market by only allowing firms dependent
upon the dominant undertaking to stay in business.
20
Although less sweeping than Commercial Solvents,2 1 the lan-
guage seems to imply that companies in dominant positions
have a duty to supply in many cases. It also suggests, however,
that the duty to supply a customer or distributor may be less
strict than the duty to supply a competitor and that the duty to
supply does not apply in every situation. A dominant company
may not stop supplies in order to discourage competition. A
competitive reaction by a dominant company must be reason-
able and "proportionate to the threat."22 This formula, which
would not be appropriate to a refusal to supply a competitor,
suggests that the rules on refusals to supply are different when
competitors and other customers are involved. A dominant
company must not interfere with its distributors' commercial in-
dependence, including their freedom to promote rival brands.
The duty of a dominant company goes much further than
merely refraining from trying to obtain exclusive purchasing ar-
rangements.
20. Id. at 293, 1 189-94, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 496-97. Facts to note about United
Brands are that United Brands had a sufficient amount of bananas to supply to Olesen.
Id. at 217. Olesen was an important distributor in Denmark. Id. at 216. No other
justification for the refusal to supply Olesen was suggested. Further, United Brands was
not a competitor of Olesen at the level of distribution. Id. at 216-17. The case there-
fore involved supply to a customer or distributor, not a competitor.
The Court did not say that merely because United Brands was dominant it was
essential for distributors to be able to sell its products, or that it was essential for United
Brands to supply. The Court based its holding on the specific facts of the case.
21. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Solvents).
22. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 293, 1 190, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 496-97.
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3. BP/ABG
In the BP/ABG case, the Commission considered that BP
had unlawfully reduced supplies to ABG when a petrol shortage
occurred during the oil crisis in 1974.23 ABG was a petrol dis-
tributor with which BP was in competition downstream.24 ABG
had bought primarily from BP, and during the crisis oil compa-
nies were able to supply only their traditional customers. The
Court held that, as ABG no longer 'had a long-term contract with
BP, BP was free, in times of scarce supply, to treat it less favorably
than customers that had long-term contracts.25 The selective re-
duction of supplies to ABG was thereforejustified. ABG was only
an occasional buyer from BP at the relevant time, though it had
previously had long-term arrangements.2 6 There was no sugges-
tion that the termination of ABG's long-term contract was in-
tended to be anticompetitive or that BP's long-term contracts
were open to criticism on competition grounds.
4. Maxicar v. Renault and Volvo v. Veng
A more sophisticated question of supply to downstream
competitors was raised in Maxicar v. Renault27 and Volvo v.
Veng.28 Specifically, when is the refusal to license intellectual
property rights for replacement car body parts contrary to Arti-
cle 86? Design and similar rights were preventing independent
producers of spare parts from producing replacement spare
parts in competition with car manufacturers. 29 The Court said
that it was lawful for a dominant company to obtain exclusive
rights under intellectual property. legislation. However, the
Court also stated that the exercise of these rights may be prohib-
ited if it gives rise to abusive conduct by the dominant company,
such as an "arbitrary" refusal to deliver spare parts to independ-
23. Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappj BV v. Commission, Case 77/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 1513, [1978] 3 C.M.LR. 174.
24. Id. at 1517, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 178-81.
25. Id. at 1528, 32, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 192.
26. Id. at 1527, 1 29, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 192.
27. Consorzio Italiano Della Componentistica Di Ricambio Per Autoveicoli v.
R~gie Nationale Des Usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R 6039, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 265 [hereinafter Maxicar].
28. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122.
29. Id. at 6213, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 127; see Maxicar, [1988] E.C.R. at 6040, [1990]
4 C.M.L.R at 281.
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ent repairers, as occurred in Hugin v. Commission,"° fixing prices
for spare parts at an unfair (i.e., an excessively high) level, or a
decision to cease producing spare parts for a particular model
though many cars of that model are still in use.31 In other
words, as the Advocate General said, the mere refusal to license
is not in itself automatically contrary to Article 86.32 There must
be some additional element in the dominant company's behav-
ior. The judgment deals with possible abuse of a dominant posi-
tion without discussing directly the needs of companies wishing
to supply competing replacement parts.
5. Magill/RTE/BBC
Another complex set of cases involving intellectual property
issues and supply to downstream competitors was Magill/RTE/
BBC. 3 BBC and RTE (the Irish television authority) each pub-
30. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345. In this case, Hugin, a cash register manufacturer, had refused
to supply spare parts for its registers to a downstream competitor, a company operating
a repair and maintenance service. The Commission found that the refusal was to pro-
tect its own service and maintenance activities from competition. The Court accepted
that Hugin was dominant in the market for bulk purchases by service companies of
spare parts that they needed for Hugin cash registers. Production of spare parts for
Hugin machines by any other supplier would have been uneconomic. The Court an-
nulled the Commission's decision ordering supplies on the grounds that no effect on
trade between Member States had been proved. Id. at 1898-1901, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R1 at
372-74. A "decision" is a strictly, legally binding recommendation. The Commission's
authority to issue decisions arises under Article 155 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 155. The Court did not rule on the question of abuse (the company to
which supplies had been refused had not gone out of business) or on the justification
suggested by Hugin (maintenance of the reputation of its cash registers).
31. Hugin, [1979] E.C.R. at 1874, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 349. This is presumably
because such a measure forces the owners of these models to abandon them and buy
newer ones, and because it disregards consumers' needs.
32. Opinion of Advocate General Reischl, Hugin, [1979] E.C.R. at 1902, [1979] 3
C.M.L.R. at 347.
33. Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter RTE]; The British Broadcasting
Corporation and BBC Enterprises Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-70/89, [1991] E.C.R. II-
535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter BBC]; Independent Televi-
sion Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-575, [1991] 4
C.M.LR. 745 (Ct. First Instance). Magill TV Guide Ltd. intervened in support of the
Commission. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance).
Opinion of Advocate General Gulman, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Joined
Cases C-241-42/91 P (Eur. Ct. J. June 1, 1994) (Court decision not yet issued). The
Court of First Instance's judgement in the above cited cases has been much discussed.
See, e.g., Ian Forrester, Software Licensing in the Light of Current EC Competition Law Consid-
erations, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 5, 5-20 (1992); Andr6 Franqon, 45 REv. TimS-.
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lished their own weekly guide to their respective television and
radio programs, but both refused to give details of their pro-
grams to other magazines more than a day in advance. This
made it impossible for anyone to publish a Single independent
weekly magazine giving all the BBC and RTE programs through-
out the week.8 4 The Court of First Instance held that the BBC
and RTE held dominant positions in the markets for the supply
of their weekly program lists and for the magazines in which
these were published. 5 The refusal of both television compa-
nies to provide details of their programs to a competing weekly
magazine was an abuse contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 6
Only restrictions on competition that are inherent in the protec-
tion of the actual substance of intellectual property rights are
permitted in Community law. A dominant company is not free
to exercise such rights to pursue an aim contrary to Article 86.
Citing Volvo v. Veng the Court said that by reserving to itself
the exclusive right to publish their weekly program lists, BBC
and RTE were preventing the emergence of a new product, a
general TV magazine." They were using copyright in the listing
derived from broadcasting to secure a monopoly in the deriva-
tive market for weekly TV guides. This went beyond what was
necessary to fulfil the essential function of copyright. The re-
fusal was comparable to the arbitrary refusal of a car manufac-
turer to supply spare parts to an independent repairer in the
TRMLLE DF D. COMMERCIALE ET DE D. ECON. 372, 372-76 (1992); Marie-Ang~le Hermitte,
Guides Hebdomadaires de Tdlusion, J. DU D. INT'L 471, 471-77 (1992); Ronald E. Myrick,
Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Triable in a Unitaiy Market, 14 EUR. INTELL
PRop. REv. 298, 298-304 (1992);Jonathon Smith, Television Guides: The European Court
Doesn't Know 'There's So Much In It', 13 EuR. COMPETITION L. Rxv., 135, 135-38 (1992);
Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal With Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law: A
Small Contribution to a Necessary Debate, 13 EuR. COMPETIToN L. REv. 234, 234-44 (1992);
Thomas C. Vinje, Magill Its Impact on the Information Technology Industry, 14 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. Rnv. 397, 397-402 (1992); Michel Waelbroeck, Bi-AnnualReniew of EEC Competition
Cases 1989-1991, in 1991 FoRDHAM CORp. L. INsT. 111, 134-37 (Barry Hawk ed., 1992).
34. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. 11-492, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 594; BBC, [1991] E.C.R. at II-
561, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 675.
35. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at HI-517, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 614-15; BBC, [1991] E.C.R.
at 11-587, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 691-92.
36. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at H-522, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 619; BBC, [1991] E.C.R. at
IH-566, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 696.
37. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122; see supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Veng).
38. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-520, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 617-18; BBC, [1991] E.C.R.
at HI-564, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 694.
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derivative market of car maintenance and repair. Also, like a car
manufacturer's decision to stop production of spare parts for a
model still in use, the BBC's refusal failed to take consumers'
needs into consideration. 9
On appeal to the Court, Advocate General Gulman dis-
agreed with the Court of First Instance. 40 In a long, careful opin-
ion, he said that the central issue was whether, and if so, when, a
refusal to license may be contrary to Article 86. Such a determi-
nation depends bn whether there are:
[S]uch special circumstances in connection with a refusal to li-
cense that it can no longer be regarded as a refusal to license in
itself. If Article 86 can apply where the dominant undertaking
has done no more than refuse to grant licenses, but where there
were special circumstances in connection with the refusal to
license, the position will be that the infringement of Article
86 can be terminated only by granting licenses.
41
He went on to point out that, in some situations, the owner of
the right can terminate the violation of Article 86 without licens-
ing the right, either by resuming supplies to people improperly
denied supplies or by lowering prices. In these situations, Article
86 does not lead to interference with the specific subject matter
of the right. He said later:
I consider that in fact, as the Commission has argued,
unreasonable royalties and a discriminatory licensing policy
are examples showing that it is possible pursuant to Article 86
to interfere with rights within the specific subject-matter
39. There are several points to note about the Magill/RTE/BBG cases. Advance
information about each week's programs is essential for the publication of any weekly
TV magazine or guide. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-492-93, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 594; BBC,
[1991] E.C.R. at 11-541, [1991] 4 C.M.L.Rt at 675. Also, the market for magazines is
quite distinct from the market for transmitting television and radio programs. RTE,
[1991] E.C.Rt at 11-492-94, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 594-95; BBC, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-541-42,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 675-77. The case can, therefore, be regarded either as involving
refusal to make available an essential facility for entry into the market for comprehen-
sive TV guides or an effort to extend copyright and monopoly control over program
listing into the market for comprehensive TV publications. Finally, the case was dealt
with on the basis of the needs of a new entrant into a new market, seeking to offer a
new product which did not exist at the relevant time. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-520,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 617-18; BBC, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-564, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 694.
40. This case has not yet been decided at the time of publication.
41. Opinion of Advocate General Gulman, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission,
Joined Cases C-241-42/91 P, at 14, 1 40 (Eur. Ct. J. June 1, 1994) (Court decision not
yet issued).
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where those rights are exercised in special circumstances.
The dominant undertaking does not do anything more than
exercise rights within the specific subject-matter, namely im-
pose royalties and refuse to grant licenses. But the exercise of
those rights takes place under special circumstances since the
undertaking demands royalties which are considerably higher
than in other Member States or refuses a license at the same
time as licenses are in fact given to others. Application of
Article 86 to the two situations would signify interference with
rights falling within the specific subject-matter since the possi-
bility for the owner [of the registered design] to freely deter-
mine his remuneration would be restricted and since the
owner would be required to grant a license to the person
against whom he had discriminated. There is no reason to
define the charging of unreasonable royalties to operation of
a discriminatory licensing policy as conduct which in general
is outside the specific subject-matter of copyright."2
He went on to further consider the Commission's argument that
by refusing a license RTE was preventing the emergence of a
new kind of product.
The Commission contends that in classifying a product as
new it is not relevant whether it will compete with the copy-
right owner's own products.
I do not believe that the Commission's view is tenable.
I consider it appropriate to find that there is an abuse of a
dominant position if a copyright owner by means of his copy-
right prevents the emergence of a product which does not com-
pete with his product since it meets other consumer needs
than those that are met by his product.
The contrary is true, in my view, if copyright is used in order
to prevent the emergence of a product which is produced by
means of the work protected by the copyright and which com-
petes with the products produced by the copyright owner
himself. Even if that product is new and better, the interests
of consumers should not in such circumstances justify inter-
ference in the specific subject-matter of the copyright. Where
the product is one that largely meets the same needs of con-
sumers as the protected product, the interests of the copy-
right owner carry great weight. Even if the market is limited
to the prejudice of consumers, the right to refuse licenses in
42. Id. at 21, 61 (citations omitted).
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that situation must be regarded as necessary in order to guar-
antee the copyright owner the reward for his creative effort.
43
Additionally, he said:
The Commission has further claimed that the example from
the judgments of the Court of Justice in Volvo v. Veng and
CTCRA v. Renault cited by the Court of First Instance is rele-
vant to a decision in the present cases. According to the
Commission the situation of Magill corresponds to that of an
independent repairer in so far as both are dependent on the
supply of products from an upstream market (in program list-
ings and car parts respectively) in order to carry on an activity
on a derivative market (the market for television guides and
the market for repairing Volvo and Renault cars respectively)
where they compete with their suppliers (RTE's and ITP's
own weekly television guides and Volvo's and Renault's au-
thorized repairers respectively). The Commission concedes
however that the analogy is not complete since Magill's situa-
tion differs in so far as the supply of a product was not suffi-
cient for Magill to be able to carry out its activity as Magill
needed to obtain a license in order to produce copies of the
protected work itself.
The difference is precisely crucial. As RTE and ITP point out,
a distinction must be drawn between a refusal to supply a prod-
uct to customers who wish to use that product on a derivative
market and a refusal to grant a license to a competitor who
wishes to produce and sell products incorporating the pro-
tected work. In the first case the existence of any infringe-
ment of Article 86 does not depend on whether the products
concerned are protected by an intellectual property right...
[I]t is appropriate to draw an analogy with the situations at
issue in Volvo v. Veng and CICRA v. Renault, namely that Volvo
and Renault were entitled to refuse a license to market spare
parts that had been produced without Volvo's and Renault's
approval. It should be noted that the Court ofJustice did not
see fit in that connection to distinguish between licenses for
the purpose of competing on the market for the sale of spare
parts and licenses for the purpose of competing on the mar-
ket for repairing Volvo and Renault cars.
There is therefore no basis for treating the exercise by a copy-
right owner of his copyright in order to prevent competitors
43. Id. at 30, 1 94-97.
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from using the protected work differently according to the
market on which such use takes place.... [T]he possibility of
exploiting the copyright on what is described as a derivative
market must be regarded as necessary in order to obtain suffi-
cient reward for creative effort.44
6. Hilti
The Hilti45 case concerned the Commission's finding that a
manufacturer of nail guns and the nails and cartridge strips that
are used with them had abused its dominant position in the nail
gun market by practices that prevented competitors from supply-
ing nails for use with Hilti guns.46 The Court of First Instance
upheld the Commission's decision, stating that nail guns, car-
tridge strips, and nails constitute three separate markets, and
that there is a separate market for Hilti-compatible nails. Hilti
had abused its dominant position by demanding excessive fees,
needlessly prolonging proceedings for the grant of compulsory
licenses to competitors, and by selective and discriminatory poli-
cies. These included reducing discounts to its customers when
Hilti cartridge strips were bought without Hilti nails, and refus-
ing to fulfil orders or to honor guarantees when non-Hilti prod-
ucts were used.48 Hilti had failed to ask the U.L authorities to
confirm its claim that non-Hilti nails were dangerous, and thus,
had no right to eliminate their use itself.
On appeal, the Court of Justice also found against Hilti.
The Commission had found that Hilti had tied the sale of nails
to sales of strips, refused to supply cartridges to competing pro-
ducers of nails, and refused to supply cartridges for resale.49
Hilti also gave more favorable discounts to customers that
agreed to buy only its products.5" Hilti's practices, therefore,
though intended to exclude downstream competitors, involved
both its customers and its competitors. Consequently, as in Com-
44. Id. at 33-34, 11 109-12.
45. Hilti AG v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4
C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. First Instance); Hilti AG v. Commission, Case C-53/92P, [1994] E.C.R.
-, [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. 614; Commission Decision No. 88/138/EEC, O.J. L 65/19 (1988)
(Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti).
46. Hili, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-1447, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 19.
47. Id. at 11-1453, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 26.
48. Id. at 11-1452, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 11-1451, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 25.
50. Id. at 11-1452, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R at 25.
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mercial Solvents,5 there was no question of the dominant com-
pany having difficulty in supplying sufficient quantities, there
was little competition downstream, and the dominant firm pro-
vided no real justification for the refusal to supply.
C. The Case Law of the Commission
1. National Carbonising Company v. Commission
Apart from the specialized Commission decisions about
telecommunications and performing rights, the first relevant
Commission case is National Carbonising.52 In that case, the Na-
tional Coal Board (the "NCB") had a dominant position on the
U.K. market both for coal, which is the raw material for making
coke, and for coke. National Carbonising, a competing coke
producer, claimed that the price at which the NCB sold coal for
coke-making was too high, and the price of industrial coke sold
by the NCB too low to enable National Carbonising to produce
industrial coke and sell it at a profit in competition with the
NCB.53 Ultimately, the Commission rejected the complaint, es-
sentially on the grounds that National Carbonising was unaf-
fected in the market for domestic coke, and the case was finally
dropped. However, the case illustrated the principle that a dom-
inant company selling both a raw material and the downstream
product made from it has a duty not only to supply the raw mate-
rial to competitors, as in Commercial Solvents,54 but also to do so at
a price that, in all cases, enables its downstream competitors to
remain in business if they are reasonably efficient. The Commis-
sion also considered that a dominant company in this situation
has a duty to trade with its subsidiary on the same basis in all
respects as it trades with its subsidiary's competitors. Any subsidy
would be discriminatory.
2. IBM
In the Commission's IBM case,55 IBM had sold its large com-
51. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Solvents).
52. National Carbonising Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Case 109/75R, [1975] E.C.R.
1193; [1975] 2 C.M.L.1R 457; Commission Decision No. 76/185/ECSC, O.J. L 35/6
(1976) (National Carbonising).
53. National Carbonising, [1975] E.C.R. at 1194, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R at 458.
54. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Solvents).
55. Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639,
[1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635 [hereinafter IBM]; IBM, 17 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at § 3.4.1 (1984).
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puter only with main memory and basic software, thus prevent-
ing competing suppliers of memory and software from selling
these products to IBM customers, who wanted large IBM com-
puters.5 6 Additionally, IBM had refused to supply certain
software to users of non-IBM mainframe computers. 7 IBM had
also developed a practice of announcing new hardware and
software products and taking orders for them from buyers long
before the new products were delivered or the technical details
of their interfaces were disclosed."8 This meant that competing
suppliers of IBM-compatible hardware or software that needed
to be used with IBM's new products could not begin to modify
the interfaces of their products, to make them compatible with
IBM's new products, until long after IBM began to take orders.59
IBM ultimately undertook to disclose, in good time, sufficient
interface information to enable competitors to adapt their hard-
ware and software to IBM's new products and to supply the
software that it had previously refused to supply for use with non-
IBM main frame computers.6 " The case was settled on the basis
of IBM's undertakings, so that the Commission never had occa-
sion to revise the position it adopted in its Statement of Objec-
tions to IBM or otherwise to elaborate on its legal analysis. The
essence of the Commission's position was that by selling main
memory and basic software with its large computers, IBM was in
effect unnecessarily "tying" the two former products to the large
computers. By refusing to supply certain software for use with
non-IBM mainframe computers, IBM was denying users of non-
IBM computers an important element in the IBM-based system,
and thereby creating a disadvantage for its competitors selling
IBM-compatible mainframe computers. By delaying disclosure
of interface information on new IBM products while taking or-
ders for them, IBM was creating an artificial advantage for itself
56. IBM, [1981] E.C.R at 2642, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 637.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Points to note about the IBM case are that IBM sold a series of hardware and
software products designed to be used with one another. Id It was horizontally inte-
grated. Further, its competitors each sold some, but not all, of the same range of prod-
ucts, for use with IBM's products. Id. In its resolution of the dispute, IBM undertook to
give its competitors an opportunity that it had not previously given them to adapt their
products and to sell them for use with IBM's products. IBM, 17 E.C. BuLL., no. 10, at
§ 3.4.1 (1984).
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and denying its competitors an opportunity to adapt their prod-
ucts to the new IBM products.
3. BBI/Boosey & Hawkes
Boosey & Hawkesn' was an interim measures decision of the
Commission under Article 86. The decision required Boosey &
Hawkes to resume supplies of musical instruments and spare
parts to two companies, a repairer and a retailer of musical in-
struments, which had set up a joint venture to supply instru-
ments directly to bands.62 They needed Boosey & Hawkes prod-
ucts to have a complete product range, and they risked going
out of business if they could not get them.63 Boosey & Hawkes
sold only to dealers. In its decision, the Commission said:
A dominant undertaking may always take reasonable steps to
protect its commercial interests, but such measures must be
fair and proportional to the threat. The fact that a customer,
of a dominant producer becomes associated with a competi-
tor or a potential competitor of that manufacturer does not
normally entitle the dominant producer to withdraw all sup-
plies immediately or to take reprisals against that customer."
61. BBI/Boosey & Hawkes, O.J. L 286/36 (1987).
62. 1& at 41, 1 24.
63. Id. at 41, 1 10.
64. Id at 41, 1 19. The Commission also stated:
A course of conduct adopted by a dominant undertaking with a view to
excluding a competitor from the market by means other than legitimate com-
petition on the merits may constitute an infringement of Article 86 .... The
injury to competition would be aggravated where (as is alleged here) the
stated purpose of the action is indirectly to prevent the entry into the market
of a potential competitor to the dominant producer.
Id. at 40-41. The Commission further observed that:
There is no obligation placed on a dominant producer to subsidize competi-
tion to itself. In the case where a customer transfers its central activity to the
promotion of a competing brand it may be that even a dominant producer is
entitled to review its commercial relations with that customer and on giving
adequate notice terminate any special relationship. However, the refusal of all
supplies ... and the other actions B&H has taken against them as part of its
reaction to the perceived threat.., would appear in the circumstances of the
present case to go beyond the legitimate defence of B&H's commercial inter-
ests.
Id. at 41, 1 19.
458 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNTAL [Vol. 18:437
4. London European-Sabena and British Midland v. Aer Lingus
In the Sabena" case, Sabena was dominant in Belgium in
the market for computer reservation services. The Commission
declared the refusal by Sabena to give a competing airline access
to its computer reservation system ("CRS") to be contrary to Arti-
cle 86. Sabena had refused to allow London-European access to
its CRS in order to put pressure on the other airline to raise fares
on the London-Brussels route or to withdraw from it.66 The re-
fusal was liable to prevent London-European from operating on
that route.67 The Commission's decision refers expressly to the
Commercial Solvents6" case and treats Sabena's behavior as a re-
fusal, for anticompetitive reasons, to supply an essential service.
There was relatively little competition on the London-Brussels
route and spare capacity on Sabena's CRS.69
The British Midland-Aer Lingus7 ° case also concerned air-
lines. Aer Lingus had refused to "interline" with British Mid-
land, which at the time of the decision was one of the only com-
petitors of Aer Lingus on the Dublin-London route.7 Interlin-
ing is an International Air Travel Association ("IATA") practice
by which almost all airlines agree to issue tickets on behalf of
one another so that, for example, one airline issues a ticket for a
journey, part of which will be made on another airline.72 Inter-
lining also allows a passenger to use a ticket issued by one airline
for a return joumey on another.7"
Aer Lingus terminated its agreement to interline with Brit-
ish Midland when the latter, a strong competitor, began to com-
pete with Aer Lingus on the Dublin-London route.' The Com-
mission held that Aer Lingus was dominant on that route and
that the refusal to interline with its competitor was contrary to
65. Commission Decision No. 88/589/EEC, OJ. L 317/47 (1988) [hereinafter
London European-Sabena].
66. Id. at 47-48.
67. Id. at 52, 1 32.
68. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Solvents).
69. London European-Sabena, OJ. L 317/47.
70. Commission Decision No. 92/213/EEC, O.J. L 96/34 (1992) [hereinafter Aer
Lingus].
71. Id. at 36.
72. Id. at 35, 3.
73. Id. at 35.
74. Id. at 36.
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Article 86.75 It is important to note that interlining arrange-
ments are normally multilateral and that, although not restric-
tive themselves, they are the justification for restrictive tariff con-
sultations which are subject to Article 85. Interlining is normal
industry practice except where there are, for example, doubts as
to credit-worthiness that did not arise in this case. Aer Lingus
claimed that having to interline would cause it to lose some pas-
sengers to British Midland. 6 The Commission ruled, however,
that this did notjustify imposing a "significant handicap" on Brit-
ish Midland." Whether refusal to interline is unlawful depends
on its effects on competition. It is prohibited if, objectively, it is
likely to have a significant impact on the other airline's ability to
start a new service or to sustain an existing service (in other
words, when it causes a significant handicap or barrier to entry).
Denial of interlining forces a new entrant either to operate infre-
quent flights, which results in a long, unprofitable start-up pe-
riod, or to offer frequent flights at once, attracting passengers
who want a choice of flights, but accepting low capacity utiliza-
tion.78 Either alternative means higher start-up costs.79 In other
words, for a new entrant, an interline agreement with the domi-
nant airline, if there is one, or with the other lines operating on
the routes in question, may be essential. The Commission im-
posed a duty to interline for two years.80
5. Two Holyhead Harbor Cases
Another recent Commission decision on access to essential
facilities was B&I Line v. Sealink, l an interim measures decision
under Article 86. Sealink is both a car ferry operator and the
owner of Holyhead Harbor, which B&I also uses in competition
75. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
76. Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 at 40, 1 25 (1992).
77. Id. at 44, 1 43.
78. Id. at 41.
79. Id. at 41, 1 28.
80. Id. at 44. Another similar case involved a refusal by Lufthansa to interline with
Air Europe. Lufthansa/Air Europe, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs,
XXTH REPORT ON COMPEriON Pouc, 83 (1991). It was settled without a formal deci-
sion. Id.
81. B&I Line plc v. Sealink Harbours Ltd. and Sealink Stena Ltd. (Eur. Comm'n
June 11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255 [hereinafter B&I]; Sealink and B&I,
Holyhead, 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at § 1.3.30 (1992); Luc Gyselen, Abuse of Monopoly Power
Within the Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty Recent Developments, in 1989 FoRDHAM
CORP. L. INsT. 597 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990).
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with Sealink.8 2 B&I-s berth was in the mouth of the harbor,
which is so narrow that when a Sealink vessel went by, the B&I
ship had to stop loading or unloading and to lift the ramp con-
necting the ship to the dock.83 Sealink altered its schedule of
sailings in such a way that B&I's loading was interrupted more
frequently.8 4 This improved Sealink's schedule, but harmed
B&I.85 The Commission drew a distinction between Sealink as
harbor owner and Sealink as a competing car ferry operator, and
said that as a dominant harbor owner it was not free to discrimi-
nate in favor of its own car ferry activities.86 At the time of the
decision, B&I was the only competitor of Sealink on the route
and B&I's requirements did not add to the demands on the ca-
pacity of the harbor.8 7 In its decision the Commission stated
that
a dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and it-
self uses an essential facility, i.e. a facility or infrastructure
without access to which competitors cannot provide services
to their customers, and which refuses its competitors access to
that facility or grants access to competitors only on terms less
favorable than those which it gives its own services, thereby
placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage, in-
fringes Article 86, if the other conditions of that Article are
met. A company in a dominant position may not discrimi-
nate in favor of its own activities in a related market (Case C-
260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia, 1[ 37-38). The owner of an
essential facility which uses its power in one market in order
to strengthen its position in another related market, in partic-
ular, by granting its competitor access to that related market
on less favorable terms than those of its own services, in-
fringes Article 86 where a competitive disadvantage is im-
posed upon its competitor without objective justification. 8
82. B&I, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 255.
83. Id. at 259.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 260.
86. Id. at 259.
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id. at 255-66. The Commission further stated:
This was accepted by Sealink through its subsidiary, SHL when it stated that no
agreement would be given to vary schedules if this compromised its ability to
provide an acceptable level of service to all port users. This is particularly so
where the physical configuration of the port has obliged operators to accept
differences in the services they are offered by the operator of the essential
facility, in order to maximize its efficient utilization.
1994] ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
This was the first statement by the Commission of a general prin-
ciple using the phrase "essential facility," and it was explicitly
based, as a footnote to the decision makes clear, on the case law
of the Court, beginning with Commercial Solvents.89
In 1992, the Commission adopted another interim meas-
ures decision concerned with Holyhead Harbor.90 Sea Contain-
ers had requested Sealink to allow it to use the harbor for a new
ferry service.9 Sealink delayed and caused difficulties, but fi-
nally, under pressure from the Commission, made an offer that
the Commission regarded as reasonable and nondiscriminatory,
which Sea Containers accepted.92 The Commission adopted a
decision to clarify its view of the legal position for all the inter-
ested parties.93 The Commission again stated the general princi-
ple in almost exactly the same terms as in the B&I/Sealink deci-
sion, but added: "This principle applies when the competitor
seeking access to the essential facility is a new entrant into the
relevant market."94
The owner of the essential facility, which uses the essential facility, may not
impose a competitive disadvantage on its competitor, also a user of the essen-
tial facility, by altering its own schedule to the detriment of the competitor's
service, where, as in this case, the construction of the features of the facility are
such that it is not possible to alter one competitor's service in the way chosen
without harming the other's. Specifically where, as in this case, the competi-
tor is already subject to a certain level of disruption from the dominant under-
taking's activities, there is a duty on the dominant undertaking not to take any
action which will result in further disruption. That is so even if the latter's
actions make, or are primarily intended to make, its operations more efficient.
Subject to any objective elements outside its control, such an undertaking is
under a duty not to impose a competitive disadvantage upon its competitor in
the use of the shared facility without objective justification ....
Itd.
89. Id.
90. Commission Decision No. 94/19/EEC, OJ. L 15/8 (1994) [hereinafter Sea
Containers].
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 13-14.
93. Id. at 15-16.
94. Id. at 17. To prove this the Commission quoted the Court in Hoffinann-La
Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, 11979) E.C.R. 461, 541.
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure
of a market where, as a result of the very presence of an undertaking in ques-
tion, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to
methods different from those which condition normal competition in prod-
ucts or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has
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6. Port of Rodby
In the Port of ROdby95 decision, under Article 90 of the EC
Treaty,16 the Commission was concerned with the refusal by the
Danish Minister for Transport to allow Stena to build a private
commercial port near Rodby, and to allow Stena to operate from
Rodby itself.97 The Commission ruled that there is no real alter-
native to the port of Rodby for sea transport between eastern
Denmark and Germany, and that the volume of traffic through
Rodby made it a "substantial part" of the common market.
98
The Danish railway, as the port authority of Rodby, was therefore
in a dominant position. The refusal to allow Stena to build a
harbor or to use Rodby strengthened this dominance. Because
it would have been an abuse if the state-owned Danish railways
refused a competitor access to the port, it was contrary to Article
90 for the state to do the same thing. No technical constraints
existed. There was no evidence that R0dby could not handle
more traffic, there were only two competitors on the sea route,
and Stena was willing to finance any necessary alterations.
D. Nondiscriminatoy Access to Dominant Buyers
The Commission has adopted two decisions concerned with
complaints by small, privately-owned coal mines in Britain, both
claiming discrimination in various respects in favor of British
the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still
existing in the market or the growth of that competition.
Sea Containers, O.J. L 15/8, at 17 (1994). The Commission then went on to state: "A
decision on interim measures may be just as necessary, to ensure that any final decision
of the Commission is effective, in the case of a complainant who is a new entrant as it is
in the case of an already established competitor." Id. Points to note are that Sea Con-
tainers was only the third competitor on the route, with B&I and Sealink itself, and that
the Commission considered that the capacity of the harbor would permit a third com-
petitor without undue inconvenience. Id. at 18.
95. Commission Decision No. 94/119/EEC, OJ. L 55/52 (1994) [hereinafter Port
of Rodby].
96. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90.
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States Grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules proved for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
Id. art. 90(1).
97. Port of Rodby, OJ. L 55/52, at 52 (1994).
98. Id. at 54.
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Coal by the big British electricity-generating companies.9 9 The
first of these decisions came in 1991 and was the subject of two
cases before the Courts in Luxembourg. °10 The Commission
found that the two English generating companies were jointly
dominant buyers of coal for electricity generation. The Commis-
sion acted under Article 63 of the ECSC Treaty,10 1 but assumed
that the substantive effect of Article 63 was the same as Article
86, which applies to electricity generators. "Dominant purchas-
ers are required by both Article 63 of the ECSC Treaty and Arti-
cle 86 of the EC Treaty not to discriminate between coal produ-
cers."10 2 In this case, the discrimination was between coal produ-
cers as suppliers to dominant buyers, without whose purchases
substantial British coal producers could hardly expect to survive.
In each of the two cases, the Commission found that some dis-
crimination had occurred, took action to terminate it, and re-
jected the remaining aspects of the complaints.
E. Discrimination by Railways
In its Maritime Container Network03 decision, the Commis-
sion found that the German railway, the Deutschebundesbahn
("DB"), had discriminated against container cargo transported
through Belgium and the Netherlands to ports there in favor of
containers hauled only by DB to German ports, by charging
lower freight rates. The relevant market was that for rail services
in Germany, in particular to the downstream market of com-
bined transport operators carrying containers. 0 4 These opera-
tors were not in a position to supply rail services themselves, but
were obliged to obtain them from the national railway enter-
prises.'0 5 DB had used its dominant position on the rail trans-
port market to impose discriminatory prices on the segment of
that market relating to combined transport of sea-borne contain-
99. U.K. Small Mines, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIST REPORT
ON CoMpETIION PoLicy 82-83 (1991).
100. HJ Banks & Co., Ltd. v. Banks v. British Coal, Case C-128/92, [1994 E.C.R.
-, [1994 4 C.M.L.R. 30.
101. ECSC Treaty, supra note 9; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (quoting
Article 63 of ECSC Treaty).
102. HJ Banks & Co., Ltd. v. Banks v. British Coal, Case C-128/92, [1994] E.C.R.
-, [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. 30.
103. Commission Decision 94/210/EC, OJ. L 104/34 (1994) (HOV SVZ/MCN).
104. Id. at 35.
105. Id
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ers to promote its own group's services, its own rail services, and
its subsidiary's combined transport services.
'F. Article 85 cases
1. Spices
In its Spices'016 decision in 1978, the Commission prohibited
clauses, in agreements for the sale and distribution of spices,
which prevented supermarkets from selling other suppliers'
brands of spices, except their own brands. Large ranges of
spices can be sold only in large self-service stores, not in small
retail outlets."°7 The supermarkets bound by these clauses sold
thirty percent of all spices sold in Belgium.'0 Although the deci-
sion is based on Article 85 of the EC Treaty'0 9 and does not use
the phrase "essential facility," it is based on the principle that
access to a facility (in this case, the shelves of three major super-
markets) may be essential for competitors. In the Langnese and
Schdller decisions," 0 involving German ice cream companies, the
Commission came to similar conclusions under Article 85.
2. IGR Stereo Television
The next Commission case that is of interest is IGR Stereo
Television."'1 IGR was a company owned by all the firms produc-
106. Commission Decision No. 78/172/EEC, OJ. L 53/20 (1978) (Spices).
107. Id. at 20, 1 5.
108. I&
109. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
110. Commission Decision No. 93/406/EEC, OJ. L 183/19 (1993) [hereinafter
Langnese]; Commission Decision No. 93/405/EEC, OJ. L 183/1 (1993) [hereinafter
Sch6ller]; Langnese-Iglo GmbH and Sch6ller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG v. Com-
mission,Joined Cases T-24, 28/92 R, OJ. C 199/8 (1992) (Order ofJune 16, 1992) (Ct.
First Instance).
111. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEV-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION Poucv 63-64 (1982) [hereinafter IGR]; see European
Broadcasting Union, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON
COMPETITION Poucy 1 220 (forthcoming 1994). The Commission's decisions on trade
fairs are also relevant. See Commission Decision No. 79/37/EEC, OJ. L 11/61 (1979)
(European Machine Tool Exhibitions); Commission Decision No. 82/349/EEC, OJ. L
156/16 (1982) (BPICA); Commission Decision No. 83/666/EEC, OJ. L 376/1 (1983)
(SMM&T); Commission Decision No. 85/588/EEC, O.J. L 322/10 (1994) (UNIDI).
Also consider the Commission's decisions on auctions. E.g., Commission Decision No.
74/433/EEC, OJ. L 237/16 (1974) (FRUBO); see Nederlandse Vereniging voor Fruiten
Groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van Grossiers in Zuiduruchten en ander
Geimporteerd Fruit 'Frubo' v. Commission and Vereniging de Fruitunie, Case 71/74,
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ing color television sets in Germany. 112 IGR owned the patents
needed for TV sets specially equipped for stereo reception of
German stereo TV."' IGR also owned the patents for the stereo
transmitters."14 IGR granted patent licenses to its members, but
planned to license non-members only after a certain date, and
for a limited number of sets.1 5 It used its patent rights to stop a
competing Finnish firm, Salora, from supplying stereo TV sets to
German mail order companies. Salora was thus prevented from
supplying any'stereo TV sets at the time when the new stereo
system was coming into operation in Germany. The Commission
began proceedings against IGR, which then agreed to license
Salora at once, without quantity limits." 6 The case could be con-
sidered under Article 85, as an unlawful agreement to keep
Salora out of the stereo set market while the members of IGR
exploited it themselves, or under Article 86 as a joint dominant
position of IGR's members or a dominant position of IGR itself.
On either basis, the Commission would apparently have ordered
compulsory licenses if necessary.
3. Amadeus/Sabre
The Amadeus/Sabre"7 case was an Article 85 case concerning
an agreement between two airline computer reservation systems:
Sabre, owned by American Airlines, and Amadeus, owned by a
group of European airlines. 1 8 The Commission authorized the
agreement under Article 85, but was concerned that competi-
tion was being largely eliminated between Sabre and Amadeus
and that there might not be effective competition between
(1975] E.C.R1 563, [1975] 2 C.M.L.RL 123; Commission Decision No. 78/66/EEC, O.J.
L 21/23 (1978) (Cauliflowers).
112. IGR, supra note 111, at 63.
113. I&
114. Id.
115. Id. It is also worth noting that in the IGR case, TV sets with other stereo
receivers would not have been able to receive the stereo transmission satisfactorily. Id.
Therefore, a license of the patents for receivers was essential to sell stereo TV sets on
the German market. The fact, however, that the essential facility for market entry was a
patent did not affect the outcome.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Amadeus/Sabre, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES, XXIsT REPORT
ON COMPEION PoLcv 73-74 (1992); John Temple Lang, Air Transport in the EEC -
Community Antitrust Law Aspects, in 1991 FoRDHAm CORP. L INST. 317, 317-22 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1992) [hereinafter Air Transport].
118. Amadeus/Sabre, supra note 117, at 73.
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Amadeus and the other European joint venture CRS, Galileo. 119
Each of these CRSs had a strong position in the Member State
where one of its shareholders was the dominant airline, and the
Commission was afraid that each would find it impossible to pen-
etrate one another's territories if the shareholders discriminated
in favor of their own CRS.' 20 Accordingly, the Commission ob-
tained from the principal shareholders in both Amadeus and
Galileo a series of undertakings not to discriminate against other
CRSs.' 21 The Commission saw these undertakings as ensuring
that each essential facility (the information and functions
needed by each CRS) would be provided by each of the share-
holder airlines. 122
4. TNT/Canada Post
Similar questions arose in a merger case, TNT/Canada
Post.'23 This concerned an express delivery joint venture be-
tween five national post offices. The Commission authorized the
joint venture under the Merger Regulation, but was concerned
that the post offices would discriminate in favor of the joint ven-
ture and against other express delivery companies. The Com-
mission, therefore, obtained an undertaking from the post of-
fices not to discriminate in this way. This case can also be re-
garded as an essential facility case, because cooperation with
post offices is essential for any express delivery company.
5. Disma
In Disma,124 the Milan airport joined with some oil compa-
nies to set up ajoint venture for storing and handling jet fuel at
the airport. 25 When completed, the fixed underground pipe-
lines will be the only means of refueling at the airport.12 6 Upon
considering the agreement, the Commission insisted on changes
to ensure that non-shareholders would be supplied with fuel on
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 74.
122. Id.
123. Commission Decision No. 91/C 322/14, OJ. C 322/19 (1991) (TNT/Canada
Post, DBP Postdienst, LaPost, PTT Post, and Sweden Post).
124. Disma, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON
COMPETITION PoLICy 223-24, 1 80 (forthcoming 1994).
125. I&
126. Id.
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nondiscriminatory terms. As all oil companies will have to use
the installations to refuel their customers at the airport, this was
essential. In the introduction to the XXIIIrd Report on Compe-
tition Policy, the Commission drew attention to the importance
of this case as an example of the need to ensure nondiscrimina-
tory access to infrastructure. 27
It is interesting to mention one other case. In 1993, Kodak
and four Japanese camera companies notified agreements for
the development of a new, advanced photographic system, using
wholly new technology. The Commission published a notice
summarizing the agreement 2 ' and inviting comments, without
taking any position itself. The notice, however, suggests that the
companies in question thought it appropriate to act on princi-
ples similar, if not identical, to the IGR Stereo Television 2 9 and
1B AP30 cases.
G. Telecommunication Cases
The cases on Telecommunications show that, in general, a
company in a dominant position in one market may not use its
power to extend its dominance or monopoly into other markets.
This principle is relevant to, but not to be confused with, the
principle that dominant companies must make facilities avail-
127. Id. at 1 40.
128. Commission Notification No. 94/C 68/03, O.J. C 68/3 (1994) (Canon). This
notice said that the camera companies themselves proposed that
interested parties will be granted licenses on the essential design features
agreed for APS products and not later than the date on which the products
are announced to be commercially available.
The Partners declare that they intend that licenses be made available to inter-
ested parties in time that should be sufficient for competent and diligent man-
ufacturers to introduce system-compatible products at approximately the same
time as the partners.
Licenses would be granted to manufacturers on a non-exclusive basis, and on
terms comparable to those historically available in the industry. The partners
have declared that in the product licenses they will require licensees to make a
lump sum initial payment and to pay a percentage royalty. Licensees would
also be required to license the five partners and other licensees under block-
ing patents.
Id.
129. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIrIEs, ELEv-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLicy 63-64 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing IGR).
130. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing IBM).
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able when this is essential to enable competitors to compete.13 '
1. Telecommunications Terminals
In the Telecommunications Terminals"3 2 case, insofar as it is
relevant to this Article, the Court considered criticisms of a di-
rective abolishing the exclusive rights of the national telecom-
munications monopolies to import, sell, put into service, and
maintain telecommunications terminals.' The Court held that
these exclusive rights are incompatible with the Treaty provi-
sions on free movement of goods. The Court annulled the di-
rective as far as it abolished "special" rights, for vagueness and
lack of reasons. The Court added that for competition to be in
accordance with the Treaty, competitors have to be assured
equal chances, which do not exist if one competitor has power to
lay down specifications for, and to approve products of, other
competitors. The Commission was therefore entitled to require
that this should be done by public authorities independent of
any competitor.1 34
131. See, e.g., Elliniki Radiophonia Teleorassi ('Greek Television'), Case C-260/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-2925; see also Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Almelo v.
Energiebedrijf IJsselmi NV, Case C-393/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1477, 1480, 11 94, 121, 153,
171. In Greek Television, the Greek television transmission monopoly had a subsidiary
company which produced programs. The Court said that a television monopoly can be
created for non-economic reasons concerned with the public interest (this repeated the
ruling in Guiseppe Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177). Its
operation, however, must respect the rules on competition and free movement of
goods. A television monopoly must not discriminate against foreign broadcasts unless
this is justified under Article 59. Article 90 prohibits exclusive rights to transmit and
retransmit programs when these rights are likely to create a situation in which the mo-
nopoly is led to infringe Article 86 by discriminating in favor of its own programs. In
other words, a television monopoly must give nondiscriminatory access to suppliers of
programs even if they are competing with its own program producing activities.
132. France v. Commission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 552 [hereinafter Telecommunications Terminals]; Spain v. Commission, Case
C-271/90, [1992] E.C.R. 5833.
133. Commission Directive No. 88/301, OJ. L 131/73 (1988) [hereinafter Tele-
communications Directive].
134. Points to note are that the case was dealt with primarily on the basis of free
movement of goods rules that, however, were expressly interpreted in the light of the
Treaty's objective of free competition. Also, the Telecommunications Directive took
away (and did not merely regulate the exercise of) the rights that supplemented the
telecommunications monopolies.
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2. Tlmarketing
In the TiMmarketing'35 case, the Court said that although
monopolies are not prohibited, they remain subject to Article
86. The rule in Commercial Solvents'3 6 applied to a company hold-
ing a dominant position on a market in a service that is indispen-
sable for the activities of another company in another market. If
one television station makes advertising time available only to
advertisers who also use the phone lines and telephonists of a
phone-in marketing company associated with the TV station,
then this amounts to a refusal to supply the station's services to a
competing phone-in marketing company. Such a refusal is con-
trary to Article 86 unless justified by some technical or commer-
cial requirements.
3. RTT v. GB-Inno
RYI" v. GB-Innol37 was also concerned with a national tele-
communications monopoly with powers to adopt specifications
and approve its competitors' products. Citing Tilhnarketing, the
Court said that it is contrary to Article 86 for a dominant com-
pany to reserve for itself, without objective necessity, an activity
on a distinct though related market that would risk the elimina-
tion of competition, because the activity in question could be
carried out by other companies. Article 90 of the EC Treaty pro-
hibits Member States from adopting measures that place privi-
leged companies in a situation in which they could not place
themselves without infringing Article 86.138 The extension of
the telephone system monopoly to phone apparatus, without ob-
jective justification, is prohibited. Competition may not be elim-
inated or falsified in this way.
4. Telecommunications Guidelines
In its Telecommunications Guidelines,' 39 the Commission
135. Centre Beige D'ttudes de March6 - T6lmarketing (CBEM) SA v. Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de T616diffusion SA and Information Publicit6 Benelux SA, Case
311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R 558 [hereinafter T616marketing].
136. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Solvents).
137. R~gie des T16graphes et des T6lphones v. GB-Inno-BmSA, Case C-18/88,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-5941, [1994) 1 C.E.C. (CCH) 117 [hereinafter GB-Inno].
138. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
139. Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommu-
nications Sector, O.J. C 233/2 (1991).
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said that refusal by national Telecommunications organizations
to provide certain services, in particular network and leased cir-
cuits, to third parties, would be an unlawful abuse if it was dis-
criminatory. Access charges would be lawful only if they were
imposed on an equal basis on all users, including telecommunica-
tions organizations themselves. Taking advantage of a monopoly in
order to limit the competition faced in services for which no mo-
nopoly exists would be unlawful. The Guidelines cite the
Tjlmarketing judgment.140 The Commission also made some
general statements about cross-subsidizing as an abuse under Ar-
ticle 86.
Ritter, Braun, and Rawlinson, 14 1 under the heading "access
to infrastructure," state:
[I]t is arguable on the basis of the Til.marketing case and
other precedents that the denial of access to such infrastruc-
ture or facilities is contrary to Article 86:
- if the third party depends on use of the infrastructure
or facilities for supplying his customers and building
his own infrastructure is not a realistic alternative;
- if the capacity of the infrastructure is adequate to
carry the additional traffic, having due regard to the
infrastructure operator's own requirements to pro-
vide supplies during periods of peak demand and its
other long-term commitments;
- if the traffic for which a license to use the infrastruc-
ture is sought satisfies the relevant technical stan-
dards and is in sufficient quantity to meet the operat-
ing requirements of the infrastructure;
- if the party seeking access is prepared to pay the oper-
ator adequate compensation, and
- if the request is reasonable - which requires a bal-
ancing of the interests of the operator, security of
supply and the public interest in competition and
free trade of goods and services within the Common
Market.
The Commission is considering the possibilities, means and
limits of using such an approach in the energy sector.' 42
140. Id. 1 86 n.23; see supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing Tilimarket-
ingjudgment).
141. L. R-SR ET AL, EEC COMPETITION LAw: A PRACrMoNER's GUIDE 311
(1991).
142. Id. at 312.
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H. Perfoming Rights Societies' Cases
All the Court and Commission cases on performing rights
societies are included here because access on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis to the services of the society in each Member State is
essential for all owners of copyright and performing rights to ob-
tain the royalties to which they are entitled. The cases concern
refusals to supply services, discrimination, interference with im-
ports, and imposition of unduly onerous obligations. 4 The
case law shows that the Court treats performing rights societies,
although they are essential agents for their members, in all re-
spects as dominant enterprises, and therefore, the Court's rul-
ings are equally applicable to other dominant companies. While
these cases come under Article 86, performing rights societies
are essentially large multi-member joint ventures of which the
members are owners of performing rights of various kinds.
It will be seen that it is the service provided by performing
rights societies in collecting royalties on behalf of their members
that is the essential facility. No single composer, musician, or
film producer could alone afford the cost of licensing, monitor-
ing programs, and collecting royalties. This service is feasible
only if carried out collectively. Societies are dominant vis-a-vis
owners of performing rights and must provide their services to
all owners of performing rights on a nondiscriminatory basis. If
a society denies equal treatment to one class of owner, it does so,
in practice, in the interests of another class of owner on whose
behalf it is acting as agent, rather than in its own interests. This,
however, does not seem to alter the principles involved. The na-
ture of the duty to provide its services to all owners of perform-
ing rights is based on the same principle as are other essential
facility cases.
1. GEMA Cases
The GEMA14 4 cases concerned the German national per-
forming rights society, which collected royalties on behalf of
composers, authors, and publishers of music. The Commission
143. The two latter kinds of abuse are not, strictly, relevant to this Article.
144. GEMA (Gesellschaft Ffir musikalische Aufffihrungs - und Mechanische
Vervielfaltigungsrechte) v. Commission, Case 45/71 R, [1971] E.C.R. 791, [hereinafter
GEMA I]; GEMA v. Commission, Case 125/78, [1979] E.C.R. 3173 [hereinafter GEMA
II].
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ruled that GEMA had a dominant position in Germany. There
was no other similar society there, and it would not have been
economical to set one up.'4 5  The Commission found that
GEMA had committed several kinds of abuses that were contrary
to Article 86, including discrimination against: residents of
other Member States by denying them full membership, in-
dependent importers of sound recordings (in comparison with
producers), and importers of sound reproduction apparatus (in
comparison with German producers).
2. Ministre Public v. Tournier and Lucazeau v. SACAM
In Minist&e Public v. Tounie7a48 and Lucazeau v. SACAM,"'47
the Court was concerned with various efforts by the French copy-
right management society to prevent or restrict the importation
of sound recordings from other Member States.' 48 Agreements
between copyright management societies by which they give
each other reciprocal rights to grant licenses and collect royal-
ties on their territories on behalf of copyright owners, who are
members of the other societies, are permitted by Community an-
titrust law. The Court said that Article 85 would prohibit any
agreement between copyright societies to refuse to grant direct
access to their repertoires to users in other Member States. The
Court further said that if the royalties charged to discotheques
are appreciably higher than those in other Member States, with-
out objective justification, that would be an abuse of a dominant
position.149
The Court in Toumier also said that because copyright man-
agement societies try to safeguard the rights and interests of
their members vis-d-vis users of recorded music, their contracts
145. Id. at 794.
146. Ministre Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 248.
147. Lucazeau v. Socit6 des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Rditeurs de Musique (SA-
CAM), Joined Cases 110, 241-42/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248.
148. In a similar case, Belgische Radio en Televisie and Socit6 Beige des Auteurs,
Compositeurs et Editeurs v. SV SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, 313, [1974 2
C.M.L.R. 238 [hereinafter BRT/SABAM], the Court said that a copyright society com-
mits an abuse of a dominant position if it imposes on its members obligations that are
not necessary to obtain its objectives, thereby unfairly limiting its members' freedom to
exercise their copyright.
149. Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2581, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 292; Lucazeau, [1989]
E.C.R at 2831, 2833, [1991] 4 C.M.L.Rt at 294-95.
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with users restrict competition only if they exceed what is neces-
sary to attain that aim. It would be unnecessary to require users
to take licenses of a society's whole repertoire, if a license of a
portion, such as the foreign repertoire only, as the discotheques
wanted, would fully safeguard the interests of authors, compos-
ers, and publishers of music without increasing the costs of man-
aging contracts and monitoring use. It is for national courts to
decide whether this would be the case.' 50
3. GVL
In GVL,' 5" the Commission ruled that refusal to conclude
management agreements with non-German resident artists of
other EC Member States and to manage their rights in Germany,
was discriminatory and contrary to Article 86. The laws of some
other Member States recognized rights of secondary exploitation
similar to those under German law, and GVL's refusal to con-
tract with non-resident artists, therefore, prevented them from
obtaining royalties to which they were entitled. 5 2 A refusal by
an enterprise having a de facto monopoly, the Court said, to pro-
vide its services for all those who may need them, but who do not
meet nationality or residence requirements imposed by the en-
terprise, is an abuse. 53
I. Computerized Airline Reservation Systems
The two large European computerized reservation systems
are joint ventures owned by several airlines. To ensure that all
joint venture CRSs operating in Europe were seen to be subject
to the same rules, the Commission adopted a group exemp-
tion' rather than individual exemptions. The group exemp-
tion obliges the CRS to give nondiscriminatory access to any air-
line wishing to use it. It also prohibits any airline that owns or
controls a CRS from discriminating against a competing CRS.' 55
Although the group exemption is based on Article 85, both obli-
gations are essentially based on the principle of nondiscrimina-
150. Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2580, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 292.
151. Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbh (GVL) v. Com-
mission, Case 7/82, [1983] E.C.R. 483, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 645.
152. Id. at 505, [1983] C.M.L.R. at 679.
153. Id. at 506, [1983] C.M.LR. at 680.
154. Commission Regulation No. 3652/93, OJ. L 333/37 (1993).
155. Id., art. 1, OJ. L 333/37 at 39-40 (1993).
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tory access to an essential facility. For an airline, a dominant
CRS is an essential facility. For a CRS, it is essential to be able to
provide information, reservations, and ticket-issuing facilities on
a dominant airline in the state where it is dominant. The Regu-
lation also allows the benefit of the group exemption to be with-
drawn if the CRS operator refuses to enter into a contract for the
use of the CRS or denies any airline access to any facilities other
than information reservations and issuing of tickets "without an
objective and nondiscriminatory reason of a technical or com-
mercial nature." 5 ' Similar obligations were imposed by another
regulation applying to all CRSs, whether jointly owned or con-
trolled or not.157
J. Landing and Takeoff Slots at Airports
An airline's access to a congested airport depends on
whether it can obtain slots for landing and takeoff at the times
that it needs. Allocation of these times is made by the airport
manager on the advice of a committee of the airlines using the
airport. As this involves competitors influencing access to an es-
sential facility, it needed exemption from EC antitrust law.
Group exemptions under Article 85 have been given, but on
condition that a certain proportion of new and unused slots are
made available to new entrants.- 8 The effect of these measures
is to regulate the access of new entrants to congested airports in
accordance with IATA practice. In particularly difficult situa-
tions, this might not be enough to comply with EC law and the
benefit of the group exemption might have to be withdrawn.
However, this has not yet occurred.
K. Railways: The Directive Granting Access to Rail Infrastructure
Although not legally an EC competition law measure, a di-
rective that requires the management of railway infrastructure to
be separated from the operation of rail services in each Member
State must be summarized here.'5 9 This directive illustrates the
essential facility principle in two respects. First, the manager of
156. Id.
157. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, OJ. L 220/1 (1989), as amended by Council
Regulation No. 3089/93, O.J. L 278/1 (1993).
158. Commission Regulation No. 1617/93, OJ. L 155/18 (1993); Council Regula-
tion No. 95/93, O.J. L 14/1 (1993).
159. Council Directive No. 91/440, O.J. L 237/25, at 26 (1991).
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the infrastructure, which is of course an essential facility for any
railway operation, is obliged to give access to the infrastructure
to a specified category of railway enterprises. 160 Second, the op-
erator of the rail services is obliged to provide locomotives and
traction for that category of company on a nondiscriminatory
basis. " ' In Europe, because each national manager of railway
infrastructure and each national provider of rail transport serv-
ices is dominant, these obligations are substantially similar to the
obligations that result from Article 86.162
In addition, the Commission has taken the position that
when two or more national railway companies set up ajoint ven-
ture to provide transport services, they should be obliged under
Article 85161 to give the same facilities to competitors of thejoint
venture as they give to the joint venture itself, and on the same
or equivalent terms.'6 The Commission has stated its position
in this respect in the Eurotunnel165 and Channel Tunnel Night
Services' 66 cases.
II. ESSENTIAL FACILITY AND SIMILAR SITUATIONS:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRNCIPLES
This part of the Article is a synthesis, based on the principle
that a dominant company has, at least in some cases, a duty to
supply, if a refusal will cause a significant effect on competition.
This is the minimum duty that can be deduced from the numer-
ous statements and rulings by the Court and the Commission.
As the effect on competition increases, it becomes harder to jus-
tify the refusal and accordingly, less weight should be given to
the argument that it is in the long-term pro-competitive to allow
a dominant company to decide with whom it will contract.
A company whose business is the sale of goods or services
must have a reason if it refuses to sell them to a willing buyer. It
might wish to use the goods or service in its own operations, or
to distribute them itself. In the absence of some legitimate busi-
160. Id., O.J. 237/25, at 28 (1991).
161. Id., oJ. 237/25, at 27 (1991).
162. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
163. Id. art. 85.
164. Commission Notice, O.J. C 149/10 (1993) [hereinafter Night Services]; Com-
mission Notice, O.J. C 176/2 (1990) [hereinafter Eurotunnel].
165. Eurotunnel, O.J. C 176/2 (1990).
166. Night Services, O.J. C 149/10 (1993).
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ness explanation, a refusal to supply is not what the Court calls
"normal competition." A refusal to supply a customer that is not
a competitor of any part of a dominant supplier's activities has
anticompetitive effects only if it is an effort, directly or indirectly,
to get the customer to buy exclusively from the dominant com-
pany. The United Brands' 67 case presents an example of this situ-
ation.
When the customer is also a competitor of the dominant
company in some market, usually downstream from the point at
which the refusal to supply occurs, the effect on competition
largely depends on three factors: (1) whether the buyer can ob-
tain the goods or service elsewhere; (2) whether there are other
downstream competitors; and (3) how important the goods or
services are to the buyer's business. If the buyer has another sat-
isfactory source of supply, if the goods or services are not essen-
tial, or if one more competitor will not add significantly to com-
petition, antitrust law should not oblige the dominant company
to supply.' 68 If, however, in practice, the refusal by the domi-
nant company to supply means that one of very few competitors
is forced out of the market, EC antitrust law requires the domi-
nant company to supply.
The EC case law does not suggest that a refusal to supply by
a dominant enterprise is always regarded as having an effect on
competition. Such a strict view would probably be incorrect.
There would be no basis in antitrust law for a rule requiring a
dominant enterprise to supply even if a refusal caused no effect
on competition. However, if the consequence of a refusal by a
dominant enterprise to supply is that all or most of its competi-
tors are excluded from the market, only strong business reasons
can justify the refusal. In brief, access to a facility is "essential"
when refusal would exclude all or most competitors from the
market. In order to understand the present Community law
fully, it is also necessary to describe some similar situations, in-
volving other legal principles.
The difficult and developing principle of essential facilities
167. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R at 429; see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing United
Brands).
168. U.S. lawyers must remember that the principle of proportionality in EC law
says that official action isjustified only if it does not impose inconvenience dispropor-
tionate to the result to be achieved.
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concerns companies that have a dominant position in one mar-
ket, usually an upstream market, and that also provide goods or
services in a downstream market. Cases that may raise issues of
essential facilities, or similar issues, include:
- car ferry companies that provide harbours for other ferry
companies; 1
69
- companies that provide separate but related services;
- railways that both transport goods and provide haulage for
other companies that transport goods;
170
- television companies that sell magazines giving TV pro-
grams; 17
- banks that control check clearing facilities;
- airlines with which other airlines wish to "interline;"
72
- airlines that own or control computerized reservation systems
that are essential to enable travel agents to get flight informa-
tion and make reservations;
17 3
- airlines that operate airports;
- telephone companies that provide mobile telephones, and
long-distance wire telephone lines;
- companies that own electricity grids and power lines and gas
pipelines;
- performing rights societies that are needed to collect royal-
ties on behalf of owners of rights in musical 'and other
works.1
74
An essential "facility" in the sense used here may be a prod-
uct, such as a raw material, a service, or access to a physical thing
or place, such as a harbor or an airport.
169. See, e.g., B&I, (Eur. Comm'nJune 11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; see
also supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving Holyhead Har-
bor).
170. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (discussing factors in railway
cases).
171. See, e.g., RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct.
First Instance); see also supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text (discussing RTE).
172. See, e.g., Aer Lingus, OJ. L 96/34 (1992); see also supra notes 70-80 and ac-
companying text (discussing Aer Lingus).
173. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing factors in CRS
cases).
174. See, e.g., Lucazeau v. Soci&t des Auteurs, Compositeurs et P-diteurs de
Musique (SACAM), Joined Cases 110, 241-42/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 248; Ministare Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4
C.M.LR 248; see also supra notes 148-50 and accompanying notes (discussing Lucazeau
and Tournier and factors in performing rights society cases).
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In the majority of cases, the relationship between the two
products or services is vertical. For example, one product or ser-
vice is supplied to the dominant company's own downstream op-
eration, as well as its competitors, and the other is supplied by
the downstream operations to third parties. In some of these
cases, however, the relationship between the two products or
services provided by the dominant company is horizontal, mean-
ing both are simultaneously provided for use by its customers.
This horizontal category of cases is considered separately below.
In all of these cases, competition law may oblige the domi-
nant owner of the essential facility to cooperate with its down-
stream competitors, on competition grounds. These cases can
only be resolved by reference to basic principles of antitrust eco-
nomics. There are no specific legal rules that help to resolve
them, and the applicable European case law has been pragmatic,
cautious, and its implications not always clear.
Apart from the question of whether the company in ques-
tion is dominant in the upstream market, several kinds of ques-
tions arise:
- what are the dominant company's duties to grant its competi-
tors access to facilities that it owns or operates and that its
competitors need to carry on their businesses and to com-
pete with it?
- what are the dominant company's duties to grant licenses of
intellectual property rights to its competitors to enable them
to make products that compete with some of its products?
- what are the dominant company's duties to enable its com-
petitors to adapt their products to make them compatible
with the dominant company's new or altered products?
Although the company's market power in the downstream
market may be relevant, the company need not be dominant on
both markets for these questions to arise. Such issues may arise
if the company is dominant on the market for the supply of the
essential goods or the services provided by giving access to the
essential facility. In practice, in most cases the dominance will
be largely due to owning or controlling the essential facility. If
the company is also dominant in the downstream market, so that
a duty to provide access to the essential facility is required for
competition in that market, the arguments for a duty to give ac-
cess are much stronger.
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These problems also raise a number of related difficulties.
There is a conflict between the fact that it is, in general, pro-
competitive to allow a company to retain for its own exclusive
use advantages it has legitimately obtained, and the fact that ac-
cess to certain facilities may be so essential to competitors that
ownership of those facilities may give a company the power to
exclude competitors entirely from a market, without having any
justification other than its ownership for doing so. The domi-
nant company has a conflict of interest between its interest as a
competitor (to keep the benefits of ownership or control to it-
self) and its interest as owner (to maximize the profits from its
ownership or the ownership of those on whose behalf it acts).
This gives rise to the question of distinguishing between legiti-
mately obtained and legitimately used competitive advantages,
which a dominant company may exclusively enjoy, and advan-
tages that are, in some sense, unfair or improper or otherwise
contrary to Article 86 to use exclusively, or which competition
law should not allow to be used exclusively.
Another difficulty is that, in most essential facility cases, the
dominant company has denied competitors satisfactory access to
a facility that it uses, without thereby improving the services of-
fered. A dominant owner of a facility is not entitled to improve
its service to recipients if there is a corresponding reduction in
the quality of the service offered by its downstream competi-
tors.17 - More difficult questions would arise if, for example, the
dominant company is able to show that all the available capacity
should be used by only one company to optimize the service to
consumers. Therefore, one question can be whether the advan-
tage to consumers outweighs the harm done to competition. A
marginal benefit to consumers would not outweigh the exclu-
sion of competitors from the market. If only one user can be
efficient, the right to use might have to be auctioned at intervals.
It is also important to note that any legal principle that
obliges a dominant company to make a contract with a competi-
tor involves administrative costs for the companies and for au-
thorities responsible for enforcing the principle. This burden is
175. See, e.g., B&I, (Eur. Comm'nJune 11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; see
also supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving Holyhead Har-
bor).
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significant for the EC Commission, which is already short-staffed
in relation to its responsibilities.
When a dominant company owns or controls a facility access
that is essential for its competitors, it has a conflict of interest
that would not arise if the facility were owned by an independent
public utility, which would have a duty of impartiality, or by a
separate owner, which, even if dominant, would be entitled to
protect its interests as owner. The dominant company's duty is
to operate the facility in such a way that the goods and services
offered by its downstream competitors are not made less satisfac-
tory or less readily available unless there is some sufficient over-
riding benefit to consumers or some reason based on the domi-
nant company's objective interests as the owner of the essential
facility, but not merely those of its own downstream operation.
The dominant company may always make its own goods or serv-
ices better for consumers, but may not take steps that merely
make its competitors' worse or discriminate against its down-
stream competitor. 176
A dominant company is always allowed to behave as would a
separate and independent owner, or an impartial independent
public authority. A standard of impartiality appropriate to an
independent owner, or the still higher standard appropriate to a
public authority, may seem strict, in relation to a company that is
not exercising authority on behalf of the state. However, where
one rule applies, it is not easy to see how any standard lower
than that of an independent owner could be justified or formu-
lated satisfactorily. Further, the duty of nondiscrimination ap-
plies only if the facility is genuinely essential.177 The case law of
the Court ofJustice on the duties of state enterprises with regula-
tory powers, another situation involving conflicts of interest, is
therefore relevant178
176. As mentioned above, more difficult questions about business justification
would arise if it was possible to improve the dominant company's service greatly at the
cost of a small deterioration in its competitor's service, because that would produce a
net benefit for users.
177. It must be kept in mind that it is usually bad business for a dominant owner to
need to discriminate in favor of its own downstream operation. It implies that its opera-
tions are less efficient than those of its competitor, and need to be subsidized.
178. The question of the extent to which Member States may confer regulatory
powers on state companies has arisen in several cases, of which the following seem the
most important to questions of essential facilities. See generally Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, Towards the Personal Communications Environment: Green Pa-
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While the essential legal principle is that the dominant com-
per on a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and Personal Communications in
the European Union, COM (94) 145 Final, annex D (Apr. 1994).
In Van Eycke v. ASPA NV, Case 267/86, [1988] E.C.L 4769, 4791, 1 16, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 330, 339, the Court said that it would be contrary to Article 5 of the EEC
Treaty if a Member State were "to deprive its own legislation of its official character by
delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic
sphere." See John Temple Lang, European Communi(y Competition Law and Member State
Action, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 114-32 (1989).
In Telecommunications Terminals, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223, a case
concerned with the lawfulness of a Commission directive, the Court said:
It should be observed that a system of undistorted competition, as laid down in
the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as
between the various economic operators. To entrust an undertaking which
markets terminal equipment with the task of drawing up the specifications for
such equipment, monitoring their application and granting type-approval in
respect thereof is tantamount to conferring upon it the power to determine at
will which terminal equipment may be connected to the public network, and
thereby placing that undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors.
Consequently, the Commission was justified in seeking to entrust respon-
sibility for drawing up technical specifications, monitoring their application
and granting type-approval to a body independent of public or private under-
takings offering competing goods and/or services in the telecommunications
sector.
Id. at 1-1271.
In GB-Inno, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941, [1994] 1 C.E.C. (CCH) 117, the
Court said:
[T]he fact that an undertaking holding a monopoly in the market for the
establishment and operation of the network, without any objective necessity,
reserves to itself a neighboring but separate market, in this case the market for
the importation, marketing, connection, commissioning and maintenance of
equipment for connection to the said network, thereby eliminating all compe-
tition from other undertakings, constitutes an infringement of Article 86 of
the Treaty.
However, Article 86 applies only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in
by undertakings on their own initiative.., not to measures adopted by States.
As regards measures adopted by States, it is Article 90(1) that applies. Under
that provision, Member States must not, by laws, regulations or administrative
measures, put public undertakings and undertakings to which they grant spe-
cial or exclusive rights in a position which the said undertakings could not them-
selves attain by their own conduct without infringing Article 86.
Accordingly, where the extension of the dominant position of a public
undertaking or undertaking to which the State has granted special or exclu-
sive rights results from a State measure, such a measure constitutes an in-
fringement of Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86 of the Treaty.
Id.
The Court then repeated the words quoted above from the Telecommunications
Terminals Judgment and went on to add:
Articles 3(f), 90 and 86 of the EEC Treaty preclude a Member State from
granting to the undertaking which operates the public telecommunications
network the power to lay down standards for telephone equipment and to
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pary must not discriminate, the National Carbonisinga79 case
shows that other principles can be involved. For example, it
would also be illegal for the dominant company to charge a com-
bination of prices for access to the essential facility and for its
downstream products or services, such that no reasonably effi-
cient downstream competitor could make a reasonable return
on capital on that basis.' ° This would imply, unless the domi-
nant company's downstream operations could be shown to be
abnormally efficient, that it was subsidizing them in some con-
cealed way, such as by not requiring dividends to be paid or a
reasonable return on capital to be made. A dominant company
could also act contrary to Article 86 by charging "unfairly" high
prices for access to the essential facility. If the competitor is
seeking shared access to the facility, it should act reasonably and
cooperate with the dominant company and other users to seek
solutions maximizing the overall benefits offered to their cus-
tomers, to solve whatever difficulty it is encountering, and to ne-
gotiate the terms of the contract for use of the facility.
Where the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to an
essential facility applies, denial of access and discrimination are
in themselves unlawful. Except in the case of intellectual prop-
erty rights, the duty to provide access is not merely a remedy to
be imposed if and when some other kind of abuse occurs.
check that economic operators meet those standards when it is itself compet-
ing with those operators on the market for that equipment.
Id.; see Ministire Public v. Taillandier, Case C-92/91 (Eur. Ct.J. Oct. 27, 1993) (not yet
reported), summarized in Wkly. Proc. of the Ct. ofJust. 30/93, at 10; Minist6re Public v.
Decoster and Others, Case C-69/91 (Eur. Ct. J. Oct. 27, 1993) (not yet reported), sum-
marized in Wkly. Proc. of the Ct. ofJust. 30/93, at 7; Procureur du Roi v. Lagauche and
Others, Joined Cases C-46/90 & C-93/91 (Eur. Ct.J. Oct. 27, 1993) (not yet reported),
summarized in Wkdy. Proc. of the Ct. ofJust. 30/93, at 3.
179. National Carbonising Co. v. Commission, Case 109/75R, [1975] E.C.RL 1193,
[1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 457; see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing National
Carbonising).
180. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 88/518/EEC, O.J. L 284/41 (1988)(Napier Brown - British Sugar). In Napier Brown - British Sugar, the Commission found
that British Sugar had infringed Article 86 by refusing to supply industrial sugar to
Napier Brown, a producer of refined sugar, by reducing the price difference between
retail and industrial sugar so that there was an insufficient margin for an efficient in-
dependent producer of retail sugar, and by discriminating against Napier Brown by
refusing to supply beet sugar. Id. The second abuse just mentioned is similar to that
considered in the National Carbonising case. See National Carbonising, [1975] E.C.R. at
1193, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. at 457; see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing National Carbonising). The decision quoted the Commercial Solvents and
Tilbmarketingjudgments of the Court.
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Whether the dominant company's activities are separately incor-
porated or not is irrelevant. A dominant company cannot avoid
its duty to contract, or justify discrimination in favor of its own
operation, by having a branch rather than a subsidiary.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY
CONCEPT IN EUROPE
This Article suggests that the essential facility concept is
more important in EC law than in U.S. antitrust law. In examin-
ing whether this is true and why it should be so, several points
are relevant. First, one should not overstate the case. Essential
facility cases involve basic principles such as the obligation to
contract in some circumstances and the obligation not to dis-
criminate. The essential facility concept may be merely a useful
label for some types of case rather than an analytical tool. Sec-
ond, the EU market is not as integrated economically as the
United States for most products and services. Though many bar-
riers have been removed, the European Union is not yet in fact
one uniform market. So there are many more dominant posi-
tions in "substantial" parts of the European Union than there
are in the United States. There are also many sectors in Europe
in which markets are often regional, such as transport facilities.
Third, in Europe, dominant state-owned companies are more
likely to discriminate or refuse to deal for protectionist reasons
(even without obtaining a benefit from doing so) than compa-
nies in the United States. Several factors including tradition, the
absence, until recently, of effective competition laws, and above
all the fact that most of them were designed as instruments of
national or industrial policy, explain this tendency. Article 90
was included in the EC Treaty because it dealt with an important
and widespread problem. Fourth, in Europe, important sectors
of industry, such as energy and transport, are being deregulated
or at least liberalized by the European Union. These measures
would be of little value if the companies concerned, most of
which are dominant in their own areas, were free to integrate
forward and to discriminate in favor of their own downstream
operations. Lastly, regulated or state-owned companies often
own facilities that are essential for all or most of their down-
stream competitors. The essential facilities principle is, in effect,
the follow-up of Article 90 of the EC Treaty. Next, because many
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important sectors were at least partly state-owned, private utility
regulation remains underdeveloped. There were and still are
many national regulated monopolies in Europe. However, each
is subject to its own purely national ad hoc regime, usually con-
sisting of a board of advisers intended to determine or influence
its policy without other legal control. Some of these arrange-
ments are disappearing due to EU measures, but they are not
being replaced by any overall EU measures, because there would
be no majority in the European Union in favor of adopting any
particular measures on such monopolies. In the resulting vac-
uum, antitrust law is being asked to deal with a problem that in
the United States has been dealt with at least partly by regulatory
legislation.
A. Dominance in a "Substantial Part" of the Common Market
A company has a duty under Article 86 to provide access to
an essential facility only if it is dominant in at least "a substantial
part" of the Community market. This question may be impor-
tant where the dominance is partly or wholly due to the owner-
ship of the facility, and where the facility is, for example, a physi-
cal harbor or airport, or airline interlining facilities on a particu-
lar route.' 8 '
In the Sugar Cartel'82 case, the Court said that the economic
importance of the geographical market concerned must be con-
sidered to see if it is "substantial." In this particular case,
Belgium and Luxembourg, with 8%-9.5% of EC sugar produc-
tion and about 5% of EC consumption,183 were a "substantial"
part of the Community market.
In the first Port of Genova' case, the Court said that in light
of the volume of traffic in Genova and its importance in relation
to maritime import and export operations as a whole in Italy, the
organization of freight handling at Genova is a "substantial part"
181. See, e.g., B&I, (Eur. Comm'nJune 11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255;
Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 (1992).
182. Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-
48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113-14/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
183. Id. at
184. Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova, Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889,1-
5928, 1 15.
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of the common market. In the second Genova'85 case, the Advo-
cate General and the Court concluded that pilotage services in
Genova were also a "substantial part," due to the large quantities
of freight going through in Genova, its place in the total quantity
of shipments imported and exported from Italy, and the fact
that pilotage is required for all ships visiting Genova.
In the Almelo' 86 case, the Advocate General said that a com-
pany whose activities were limited to a less populated province of
a Member State was not likely to be dominant in a "substantial"
part of the common market.187 It would be otherwise if the activ-
ities covered the whole Member State. Where the market is one
for the provision of services at or through a facility that is part of
the infrastructure of the transport or other industry in question,
it seems that the economic significance is more important than
the geographical area involved.
The Commission, in the two Stena Sealink 88 cases, consid-
ered that the market for port facilities for car and passenger fer-
ries on the "central corridor route" between the central part of
Western Britain and Ireland, in particular Dublin, the capital,
was "a substantial part" of the Community market. The Commis-
sion also considers that the larger international airports in the
Community are "substantial parts" of the Community market.
This is based on the volume of traffic passing through them, and
the size of the catchment areas served by them. In other words,
in the context of dominance in the market for widely sold goods,
a substantial part of the common market usually has meant a
geographical area. In the context of ports and other transport
services, a "substantial" part means a route or port that carries a
quantity of goods that is economically significant in relation to a
Member State or an important region of the Community. 8 9
185. Corsica Ferries Italia SRL v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, Case C-18/
93, 41 (Eur. Ct. J. May 17, 1994) (not yet reported).
186. Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV, Case C-393/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1477.
187. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Almelo, [1994] E.C.R at 1-1496-97,
110.
188. Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, O.J. L 15/8 (1994); B&I, (Eur. Comm'nJune
11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; see supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text
(discussing Sea Containers and B&I).
189. In Minist~re Public of Luxembourg v. Hein (Port of Mertert), Case 10/71,
[1971] E.C.R. 723, the Court seems to have assumed that a harbor on the Moselle was
important enough for Article 86 to apply, but the question does not seem to have been
considered.
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Other service markets presumably will be assessed in the light of
their geographical area or their economic importance, or both.
A Community-wide market for a specialized but expensive ser-
vice required by very few users, such as fire-fighting on oil rigs,
would probably be "substantial" in economic terms.
B. National Enforcement of Essential Facilities Principles
Some cases dealt with by the Commission were primarily of
significance to a single Member State. If the legal principles
were known clearly enough, such cases could be dealt with by
national courts, or by national competition authorities if they are
empowered to apply Community law. Enforcement by national
authorities does not significantly lessen the administrative cost of
applying the legal principles, but it shares them. It is likely that
in the future the Commission, in accordance with the Automec II
judgment, 9 ' will say that essential facilities cases involving sites
such as individual harbours or airports, and defendants that are
not public authorities, should be increasingly dealt with by na-
tional authorities or courts.
C. What are Essential Facilities?
Broadly, any company, even if it is dominant, has a right to
actively compete by all methods that are normally permitted.
Thus, it is normally entitled to keep and use to the maximum
any competitive advantage that it has legitimately acquired, even
if its competitors do not have any similar advantages and may
not realistically be able to obtain them. Legitimate competition
includes obtaining and keeping exclusive access to resources
such as patents or physical facilities that confer competitive ad-
vantages.
Competition law, however, also says that when a dominant
company owns or controls a facility to which access is essential to
enable its competitors to carry on business, it may not deny them
access, and it must grant access on a nondiscriminatory basis, in
certain circumstances. In these circumstances, it must not use its
powers as owner to give itself advantages as a competitor. The
needs of its competitors and the interests of consumers and the
public in free competition override the interests of the domi-
190. Automec Srl v. Commission, Case T-24/90, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431.
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nant company in having exclusive use of the facility that it has
acquired.
The duty to provide access to a facility arises if there is an
insurmountable barrier to entry for competitors of the dominant
dompany without access, in practice, or if without access compet-
itors would be subject to a serious, permanent, and inescapable
competitive handicap that would make their activities un-
economical. In other words, essential facility cases are not ex-
ceptions to normal rules, but specialized examples of general
rules about discrimination and competitive handicaps created by
dominant companies. It is therefore necessary to estimate the
extent of the handicap and whether it would be permanent or
merely temporary.
This approach does not deprive the company owning the
essential facility of the benefits of ownership. It may charge a
high premium for the use of the facility, provided that overall
the net charges to its own operations are no less than those it
charges to its competitors. It may, if it wishes, refuse to grant
access to a company that does not need access in order to com-
pete. It is free to develop the facility and to use it to provide
itself with exclusive services that are not essential to competition.
Business reasons may not be sufficient to justify the creation of
an insuperable barrier to entry, but due weight must be given to
them.
This is not a conflict between competition and ownership.
Acquisition of valuable property is a legitimate form of competi-
tion, and a desirable incentive for competition, that helps the
owner compete in the long-term. However, because this only in-
directly causes consumers to be offered better goods or services
at lower prices, EC law in some circumstances imposes a duty to
make competition possible by enabling competitors to offer
competing goods or services immediately.
The situation is different in cases not involvingjoint control
of the facility, when access to the facility is merely advantageous
and not essential, even though the denial of access has a substan-
tial effect on competition. It is not normally the task of competi-
tion law on companies (as distinct from Community law dealing
with government measures) to create equal conditions of com-
petition for all companies. Competition law does not oblige
even a dominant company to share, on a nondiscriminatory ba-
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sis, non-essential advantages that it has obtained or developed
through its own efforts (as distinct, perhaps, from those con-
ferred on it by governmental action). The test seems to be
whether the handicap resulting from denial of access is one that
can reasonably be expected to make competitor's activities in
the market in question either impossible or permanently, seri-
ously, and unavoidably uneconomical. If so, that is an insur-
mountable barrier to entry. If competitors have an economic
alternative, no such barrier to entry has been created or raised,
and there is no duty to provide access. When the facility is
jointly owned by otherwise independent competitors, rather dif-
ferent issues arise, which are discussed separately below.
If the activities of competitors are at a serious competitive
disadvantage vis-dt-vis the dominant company's activities, but this
disadvantage is not due to the dominant company owning an
essential facility, there is no duty to provide access. The domi-
nant company has a legitimate advantage, which it can maintain
permanently. There is no other duty to neutralize or share ad-
vantages lawfully obtained.
Technical developments, new forms of cooperation, or both
combined, may create new essential facilities that no competitor
previously had, or needed to have, in order to compete. Com-
puter reservation systems in air transport are the most obvious
example, 191 but any industry-wide service might be involved. It
therefore seems likely that essential facility cases will become in-
creasingly common in the future.
A company has a duty to provide access to competitors only
if it is in the business of providing services they need. A vertically
integrated company is not necessarily obliged to provide access
to a facility that other companies wish to use if it is not providing
them to any independent users. The key test seems to be
whether its upstream and downstream operations are merely
part of the same business, or separate in nature. For example, a
mining company that had built a harbor for its own use to ship
ore would not necessarily be obliged to make the harbor avail-
able for a car ferry, or even for another mining company. The
harbor services it provides are merely part of the process of mov-
ing ore from mine to processing facility. An electricity generat-
ing company, however, which also owned an electricity grid
191. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing CRSs).
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might be obliged to give access to the grid to other generators or
distributors, because generation and distribution of electricity
are separate activities, and it is normal practice in the industry to
use a grid for electricity produced by other generators.
Because the test of whether there is a duty to deal is an ob-
jective one, it concerns competitors in general. The dominant
company may not be fully aware of how serious a handicap it is
imposing on the competitor by its refusal of access, or how great
a sacrifice the competitor will be ready to make to overcome it.
A particular competitor cannot plead that it was especially vul-
nerable, whether or not that fact was known to the dominant
company, and the dominant firm cannot take advantage of the
fact that the competitor in question was unusually willing to suf-
fer losses or to indulge in cross-subsidizing to overcome the
handicap. This objective approach is also correct for two other
reasons,
First, Community law protects competition, not competi-
tors. The fact that one particular competitor needs access to a
facility in order to enter the market is irrelevant if other more
normally situated competitors do not. If competition necessi-
tates access for all except exceptional competitors, then access
may be made compulsory.
Second, the lawfulness of the dominant airline's denial of
access must be assessed at the time when the denial occurs. It
cannot depend on what happens afterwards, and it should be
capable of being assessed by the dominant company without any
confidential information about its competitor's business or in-
tentions. The question is, therefore, whether the denial of the
facility was one that would make it impossible for normal or aver-
age competitors to enter the market at all, or without a handicap
serious enough to make their activities uneconomic, in the sense
described above. It is not dependent on the characteristics or
the reaction of one particular competitor to which access has
been denied.
It might, however, be a defense to say that the same compa-
nies seeking access are already in a position to provide the facil-
ity economically for themselves. So, for example, in the British
Midland/Aer Lingus'92 case, it might have been a defence if Aer
192. Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 (1992); see supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Aer Lingus).
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Lingus could have shown that it was economic for British Mid-
land and other airlines to put so many flights onto the route that
interlining was not essential.
The reason why access to a facility is essential and why com-
petitors cannot provide their own facility is not important, pro-
vided that this is so. The reasons can be physical, such as the
lack of another harbor in the area, political, such as environ-
mental objections that make it impossible to build another air-
port, or economic, such as the financial inviability of building a
new harbor with access roads, or the fact that no achievable
group of musicians could set up a second performing rights soci-
ety that would have the necessary economies of scale. It is not
necessary to show that a so-called "natural monopoly" is in-
volved.
D. Competitive Disadvantages, Normal Industry Practice,
and User Awareness
It is not easy to distinguish between a mere disadvantage
and a handicap that is so serious that it is essential to avoid it.
The practice of the industry and the expectations of buyers or
users may make it essential to have access to a facility that in
other circumstances might not be essential. Dominant compa-
nies are not free to create competitive disadvantages for their
competitors by denying them access to facilities and thereby
making them second class citizens. In multi-company cases this
is important in industries in which some mutual cooperation be-
tween competitors' networks is traditional, such as banks and air-
lines, and may indeed be the only way essential facilities such as
cheque clearing facilities, performing rights societies, and simi-
lar facilities, can be created. Also, for example, it is not normally
considered essential for horizontal competitors to have informa-
tion about products of a dominant company before they become
available, but it may become essential if the dominant company
is able to make a practice of taking orders for them before they
are in fact available. 9 ' It is, therefore, likely to be important
whether the handicap on competitors is one that is known to
customers and that affects their interests and attitudes, or is a
less significant factor such as an extra cost known only to the
competitor to whom access has been denied.
193. See, e.g., IBM, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635
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Therefore, if all banks have equal access to check clearing
facilities, the unjustifiable denial of full access by a dominant or
jointly dominant bank might be a denial of an essential facility,
not because the competitor could not do business without it, but
because it would thereby be placed in a second class competitive
category in the eyes of its customers. Similarly, if travel agehts
became accustomed to making all airline reservations through
computerized reservation systems, it has become not merely an
advantage, but essential to be included on a nondiscriminatory
basis in a dominant CRS, if there is one.
In order for there to be an obligation on a dominant com-
pany to cooperate in this way, it is essential that the cooperation
between competitors is not itself significantly anticompetitive.
In the case of check clearing facilities and performing rights so-
cieties,19 4 for example, this requirement is clearly met. If the co-
operation is unlawful, it should be prohibited, and there would
be no right to participate.
In many such circumstances, cooperation between competi-
tors enables them to provide a more efficient service to their
customers, or is needed to provide the service. In such a situa-
tion, the obligations resulting from Articles 85 and 86 are likely
to be equivalent. The denial of access to the facility could be
justified only on objective grounds concerned with factors in-
cluding, for example, the technical working of the system or the
credit-worthiness of a company excluded from it. Selective ex-
clusion would have to be justified by the characteristics of those
excluded. Exclusion creates a handicap for those excluded in
comparison with a recognized category of competitors based on
usual industry practice.
The discrimination, to be unlawful, must be serious enough
to create a competitive disadvantage. Minor differences in treat-
ment without economic significance are not prohibited. In prac-
tice, therefore, normal industry practice may make what would
otherwise be a mere competitive handicap into a serious and
even insuperable barrier to entry for a normal competitor. In
particular, if the refusal to deal in accordance with normal in-
dustry practice is selective, it is likely to be unlawful if no ade-
quate justification can be shown, and if the refusal to deal has a
194. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing performing rights soci-
eties).
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sufficient effect on competition. If normal industry practice is to
deal, a dominant company cannot refuse to deal merely on the
grounds that if there were no such practice it would have no
duty to help its competitor overcome the disadvantage, for ex-
ampple, of small size, that the industry practice in fact offsets.
E. The Need for an Effect on Competition: The Character of the
Downstream Market
There is an important consequence of the principle that a
refusal to supply is contrary to Article 86 only if it has significant
effects on competition, that limits substantially the apparent con-
sequences of the broad language of the Court and that avoids
the criticisms that might otherwise be made of the Community
law rules discussed here. If there are a number of competitors in
the downstream market and it is competitive, the refusal to sup-
ply one more will not have a significant effect on competition,
unless it provides a different product or service from the others.
An effect on competition cannot be deduced from the mere fact
of a refusal to supply by a dominant enterprise, because the ef-
fects of the refusal occur in the downstream market and not in
the market in which the enterprise is dominant. As a result, in
single firm cases there is no duty to supply if the downstream
market is competitive, even if there is spare capacity, unless the
company seeking the supply can show that it will provide a signif-
icantly new kind of product or service not provided by existing
competitors, or that it is being discriminated against to discour-
age it from competing vigorously. The existing competitors may
have provided their own facilities or obtained them from some
other supplier, suggesting that the applicant could do so, or may
have obtained them from the dominant company, suggesting
that it is not refusing access to prevent competition downstream.
In most of the single firm refusal cases in Community law, there
were very few independent competitors in the downstream mar-
ket.
One of the reasons why the rules on the duty to supply
downstream competitors do not apply to distributors, so that a
dominant firm normally has no duty to supply a potential distrib-
utor, is that except in selective refusal cases, such as United
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Brands,1" 5 the refusal to supply a particular distributor does not
have a significant effect on competition.
HOw should the likelihood of effects on competition be as-
sessed? The answer, it is suggested, lies in the test outlined
above: whether the refusal makes the competition objectively
impossible for normal competitors, or imposes a serious perma-
nent and inescapable handicap on them. If the refusal has
either of these effects, it enables the company that is dominant
in the upstream market to raise its price above competitive levels
in the downstream market also.
F. The Significance of Spare Capacity
It is useful to distinguish between cases in which access to
the facility can be given to an unlimited number of competi-
tors,196 and those in which physical or other constraints mean
that only a limited number of companies can use the facility, and
the facility may or may not be fully utilized. 9 7 If the capacity of
the essential facility is not fully used, or if by its nature its capac-
ity is unlimited, the inconvenience of a duty to provide access is
normally small, and the justification for refusing access is harder
to find. If the owner of the essential facility refuses to provide
access to unused capacity and the owner or its associated com-
pany has a strong or dominant position in the downstream mar-
ket, the case for a duty to provide access is very strong.
If the capacity of the facility is already fully utilized by sev-
eral competitors, there would be little or no increase in competi-
tion if all the companies involved were required to reduce their
operations sufficiently to let in another competitor providing the
same kind of product or service. In such a situation, access
should not be ordered unless, as already mentioned, the pro-
posed new entrant can show that its entry into the downstream
market would bring about a new kind of product or service not
provided by any of the existing competitors.
This is partly elementary economics, and partly a result of
195. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R 429; see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing United Brands).
196. Such cases include interlining air tickets, collection of fees for performing
rights, patent licenses, and access to information.
197. Such cases include, for example, the size of a harbor. In some cases, such as
take off and landing slots at airports, the number of companies that can economically
use slots is much smaller than the total number of slots available.
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the Community law principle of "proportionality." This princi-
ple says broadly that official action must not be taken if it would
cause loss or inconvenience out of proportion to the objective to
be obtained. This principle requires a distinction to be made
between cases where there is spare capacity and where there is
none. Incumbents should not be required to scale down or reor-
ganize their existing activities unless an identifiable increase in
competition can be expected as a result.
In cases where the incumbents claim to be fully using the
existing capacity and, in particular, if the owner of the facility
claims that the capacity is fully utilized by its own operations and
it is dominant in the downstream market, it is necessary to look
closely at the situation to see if the capacity is not in fact being
inefficiently used (in the sense that the real capacity can be in-
creased by more efficient use without new investments) or if the
apparent use is not a real use, for example, that some slots have
been allocated but are not being used, or that long-term con-
tracts have been made primarily to make the facility unavailable
to new entrants. Of course, any agreement between users and
the owner of an essential facility to deny access to new entrants,
or to give access only on discriminatory terms, would be clearly
contrary to Article 85.
G. Access for How Many Competitors? The Character of the Facility
Even when the dominant company has a duty to provide
access to essential facilities to competitors, the characteristics of
the facility (as distinct from those of the downstream market)
are relevant, and it is not necessarily bound to provide access to
an unlimited number of competitors. Particularly in the case of
physical facilities, there may be scope for only a limited number
of competitors. In such a situation, the dominant company is
not entitled to keep the facility for itself and to prevent all com-
petition, but it may offer access to an appropriately limited
number of competitors on terms equivalent to those of its own
operations. Such an offer must itself be nondiscriminatory. The
owner of the facility must decide objectively what is the optimum
or maximum number of users that can satisfactorily use the facil-
ity, and then allocate them in a nondiscriminatory way, without
giving preference to its own operations.
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H. New Entrants
As mentioned above, the Commission considered in Sea
Containers'98 that the duty to provide access applies to a new en-
trant, and in the Magill/RTE/BBC199 cases that the duty to pro-
vide access applies to new entrants in new markets. In addition,
the EC measures on airport slots specifically benefit new en-
trants. In the Hoffmann-La Roche200 and Michelin"° ' cases, the
Court spoke of the maintenance or "development" of competi-
tion.
If the duty to provide access was limited to companies al-
ready in the market, it would unjustifiably create a privileged cat-
egory of competitors without any legal or economic rationale
and would deprive consumers of what the new entrants have to
offer. A distinction between a new entrant and an existing com-
petitor increasing its capacity would not make sense. Nor would
it make sense to protect entrants into new markets and not new
entrants into existing markets. Where there is spare capacity, or
where the nature of the essential facility is such that new en-
trants can always be supplied, new entrants must be given access.
Where there is no or insufficient spare capacity, the legal posi-
tion will depend on existing contractual commitments. Pro-
vided that these are of reasonable duration (a question discussed
below), the new entrant must be given an opportunity to com-
pete with other users or potential users for access when the con-
tracts expire, at least when this is necessary to ensure effective
competition. Where, as in the case of airports or harbours, ac-
cess may require the allocation of arrival and departure times
and periods in berths, the owner of the essential facility is (sub-
ject to specific Community measures, such as those on railways
or airport slots) obliged to behave as an independent company
would behave and to allocate or arrange slots without any dis-
198. O.J. L 15/8 (1994); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Sea Containers).
199. RTE, Case 7-69/89, [1991] E.C.R1 11-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (CL First
Instance); BBC, Case T-70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First
Instance); see supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text (discussing RTE and BBC).
200. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.' Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R.
461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211; John Temple Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of
"Abuse" of a Dominant Position Under Artide 86 EEC Treaty, 16 COMMON MKT. L Rxv. 345,
356-57 (1979).
201. NV Nederbundsche Bauden - Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/
81, [1983] E.C.R1 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
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crimination in favor of its own activities or those of the existing
users.
The dominant company is obliged to provide goods, serv-
ices, or information only for the new entrant's own use. A com-
pany cannot claim the rights of a new entrant user to sell them
to others. A proposed dealer is not fulfilling the same function
as a buyer who buys essential raw materials or components for its
own use. A new entrant dealer or middleman is entitled to buy
only if there are other companies similarly placed to whom the
dominant company sells. In any case, access to even a dominant
company's products is rarely essential for a distributor or dealer,
and a distributor does not have the same rights to be supplied as
a competitor. Nor is a dealer usually as important a competitive
force as a producer.
Any new entrant, and any user of a facility that wishes to
change its arrangements, must give whatever notice is reason-
able under the circumstances. This permits time for discussion
and negotiations of the new or revised arrangements. A new en-
trant who only wishes to provide the most profitable services at
peak periods could not claim equal rights with already estab-
lished companies willing to operate throughout the year. If the
practice of the industry is, for sound reasons, to provide a single
service that includes highly profitable and less profitable times,
there is no justification for allowing a new entrant to insist on
that practice being changed. Of course, the owner of the facility
could choose to auction the right to provide the service at the
most profitable times separately from the right to provide it at
other times, but it could not be compelled to do so.
The owner of an essential facility cannot be obliged to invest
in new capacity to provide facilities for more competitors. If ex-
tra capital investment is made to provide access to a new entrant,
after whatever period of amortisation and notice is appropriate,
the cost of the new investment should be charged in a nondis-
criminatory way to all the users. After a specially constructed
new facility is amortised, it would be discriminatory to make the
new entrant bear a disproportionate share of the cost merely be-
cause of the time at which it obtained access. It seems reason-
able, however, that a user should have to pay, directly or indi-
rectly, the cost of a new facility constructed for its use, even if
this means that it has initially higher costs than its competitors.
In such a situation, the different treatment is justified.
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New entrants can be required to accept all reasonable tech-
nical requirements to ensure the safe and efficient use of the
facility by all users, and to provide reasonable credit-worthiness
guarantees. They cannot, however, be required to meet onerous
or unjustifiable conditions, such as to provide bank guarantees
for sums clearly greater than any that they might be obliged to
pay.
I. What is the Nature of the Duty?
If a dominant company has a duty in connection with an
essential facility, it is a duty to supply on nondiscriminatory
terms. It is never a duty to discriminate in favor of a competitor
or to incur a loss. The dominant company is free to decide the
conditions on which it will supply its own and its competitors'
operations, provided that they are nondiscriminatory. 20 2 A dom-
inant company does not have a duty to do something that an
independent owner of the essential facility, without any conflict
of interests, would not do in its own interests. It may, therefore,
choose to change the use of the facility, so that it is no longer
available to its own or its competitors' downstream activities, if it
is more profitable to do so. It cannot be obliged to use the facil-
ity in an uneconomical way.
J. The Duty to Inform and Consult
Where a dominant company has a duty to give access to an
essential facility, it has a duty to provide users in time with the
information they need to exercise their rights, and to consult
with them to make the necessary arrangements. Without these
duties, the duty to give access could not be enforced. The owner
of the facility has a duty to negotiate in good faith. An example
202. See Polaroid/SSI Europe, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIR-
TEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITON Poucv 95 (1984). Polaroid was another case of refusal
to supply, involving instant film. Polaroid refused to supply without knowing where the
film would be resold. After the Commission began an investigation, Polaroid agreed
that it would supply SSI Europe. The case is of interest because in its annual Report the
Commission said in connection with the case:
As a general principle, the Commission emphasizes that an objectively unjusti-
fiable refusal to supply by an undertaking holding a dominant position on a
market constitutes an infringement of Article 86 and will also be regarded as
such when the dominant undertaking makes supply of the product condi-
tional on his having control of its further processing or marketing.
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of this issue arose in the Sea Containers203 decision, in which the
Commission criticized Sealink for delaying and making difficul-
ties in negotiations.
K. New Kinds of Services or Products
The fact that, either the existing competitors or the pro-
posed new entrant may be about to introduce a new substantially
altered product or service may be important for several reasons.
First, it may create a "now-or-never" situation in which, if the new
entrant cannot launch its new product or service at about the
same time as the incumbents, it will never catch up to them.
This was the IGR204 situation, and the Sea Containers'°5 case. Sec-
ond, the fact that the new entrant will provide goods or services
significantly different from and more competitive than those
provided by the incumbents may give it a right to access even if
there is no unused capacity and there are already a number of
competitors and effective competition in the downstream mar-
ket. Third, the fact that the new entrant plans to provide obvi-
ously useful goods or services that do not yet exist, as in the Ma-
gill/RTE/BBC 6 cases, provides a strong argument for ordering
access even when intellectual property rights are involved.
L. Interim Measures
As already mentioned, the Commission in the Sea Containers
case said that interim measures (i.e., interlocutory injunctions)
may be just as necessary to ensure that the final decision of the
Commission is effective in the case of a new entrant as in the
case of an already established competitor. In IGR Stereo Televi-
sion,207 the Commission had also been ready to adopt interim
203. o.J. L 15/18 (1994); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Sea Containers).
204. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEv-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETMON Pou-cy 63 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accompany-
ing text (discussing IGR).
205. O.J. L 15/8 (1994); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Sea Containers).
206. RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. H-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586; BBC, Case
T-70/89, [1991] E.C.R. II-535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669; see supra notes 33-44 and accom-
panying text (discussing RTE and BBC).
207. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES, ELv-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETTON Pouicy 63-64 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing IGR).
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measures if necessary when Salora was a new entrant in the new
product market. In an unpublished interim measures decision
in March 1992, Langnese and Schd1ler,20 the Commission ordered
two ice cream makers to stop enforcing c6ntracts requiring their
ice cream cabinets in small retail outlets to be used exclusively
for their products. This was done to enable Mars to enter the
retail ice cream market in Germany. The President of the Court
of First Instance did not object to this aspect of the Commis-
sion's decision.20 9 Although this case was under Article 85, ac-
cess to the only ice cream cabinets for which there is room in
many small shops is analogous to access to an essential facility for
selling ice cream in single portions.
If there is a serious risk that any final decision would be
pointless because the market would be no longer economically
attractive for a new entrant, the only way of maintaining the like-
lihood of competition is by granting interim measures. Failure
to grant interim measures would prejudice the effectiveness of
the ultimate decision.210
In the leading case on the Commission's power to order in-
terim measures, Camera Care,2 1 the Court said that interim
measures decisions should be conservatoire.212 This means pro-
tective and refers to the need to safeguard the effectiveness of
the Commission's final decision. Contrary to what was thought
at first by some commentators, it does not always or necessarily
mean "maintaining the situation as it was before the infringe-
ment." The effect may be the same in many situations, but not,
of course, the case of a new entrant that is refused access to the
market.
It should be said, however, that interim measures are fre-
quently thought of as preserving the status quo pending a final
decision. In Commission v Italy,21 3 the Court appears to assume
208. Langnese, OJ. L 183/19 (1993); Sch6ller, OJ. L 183/1 (1993).
209. Langnese, OJ. L 183/19 (1993); Sch6ller, OJ. L 183/1 (1993).
210. Of course, a Commission decision ordering interim measures in favor of a
new entrant must fulfill all the normal requirements for any interim measures decision:
a prima facie case, serious and irrevocable harm if no measures are taken, urgency, and
the balance of interests in favor of taking interim measures. The Sea Containers decision
illustrates these issues. O.J. L 15/8 (1994).
211. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, Case 792/79 R, [1980] E.C.R. 119, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 334.
212. Id. at 131, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 348.
213. Commission v. Italy, Case 352/88 R, [1989] E.C.R. 267, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
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that interim measures can only be granted to maintain the ex-
isting situation or restore the status quo ante and not to protect
the effectiveness of the final decision,2 "4 although it was not on
that ground that the Commission's application was dismissed.
As already mentioned, interim measures may be specially
needed to let in a new entrant if it would otherwise be seriously
left behind when the incumbents introduce a new kind of prod-
uct or service. This was the case in IGR Stereo Television21 ' and Sea
Containers.216
M. Capital Investment and the Duration of Agreements
If the capacity of a facility is limited to a small number of
users, the agreements that they make for its use may have the
effect of excluding new entrants. It follows that these agree-
ments would restrict competition if they were for unnecessarily
long periods, and if the capacity of the facility is fully used. The
duration that is reasonable will depend among other things on
whether either party has invested substantial sums primarily on
the basis of the agreement. The duration may have to be long
enough to justify the investment. Again, the normal practice in
the sector in question is important. The owner may decide to
make a new capital investment specifically for one user, without
being obliged to offer to make the same investment for other
users.
N. Practical Consequences
As a practical matter, although not normally required by
law, when a company is the owner of a facility that it itself uses, it
cannot normally expect to satisfactorily fulfill its duty to provide
nondiscriminatory access and to resolve its conflicts of interest
unless it takes steps to separate its management of the essential
facility from its use of it. This could involve, for example, having
different employees responsible for the management of the two
activities, the establishment of a nondiscriminatory code of prac-
tice by the companies (not by the Commission), or a consulta-
214. Id. at 273, 1 23, [1990) 2 C.M.L.R. at 5.
215. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEV-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcY 63-64 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing IGR).
216. OJ. L 15/8 (1994); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Sea Containers).
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tion procedure involving other users, with an independent
chairperson, and arrangements for independent arbitration in
the event of disputes. It might also involve formalizing its rela-
tionships with its downstream subsidiary, so that it can be made
clear that its downstream competitor is treated in the same way.
Dominant enterprises with a duty to provide nondiscrimina-
tory access necessarily have a duty not to cross-subsidize. A dom-
inant company should, therefore, keep separate internal ac-
counts on an arm's-length basis and provide all services on this
basis to ensure that it can prove that it treats its own operations
no more favorably overall than it treats those of its competitors
using the facility. As a user it should pay the same net charges as
other users. Even if separate accounts have not been kept, there
is discrimination unless analysis can show the same net contribu-
tion as is made by competitors. A company with a duty not to
discriminate in favor of its own operations cannot complain if it
has failed to keep accounts ensuring that it has not accidentally
or deliberately done so. The terms on which the dominant en-
terprise licenses its own use of the facility should be formalized.,
so that the same terms can be given to competitors.
Sometimes a dominant company makes arrangements with
another company that it is then obliged, by its duty not to dis-
criminate, to extend to others. Such a situation could have been
avoided with foresight and sound legal advice. The dominant
company cannot avoid its duty not to discriminate by saying,
however convincingly, that it would not have made the first ar-
rangements on those terms, or at all, if it had known that it
would then have to extend them to others. Sometimes it might
be cheaper to renegotiate the first arrangements, or even to pay
damages, than to extend them to others. This also raises the
question of whether the dominant company would have been
entitled to limit the number of companies with whom it entered
into arrangements. The Commission could help in such situa-
tions, if it gets an opportunity to do so, by warning the dominant
company of its duty not to discriminate, by suggesting open com-
petitive tendering or, if the first agreement purports to be exclu-
sive, by objecting to it and by requiring it to be renegotiated.
There is, however, no substitute for sound legal advice at the
right moment.
Difficulties may arise in negotiating the precise terms of the
contract that need to be made between the owner and the user
1994]
502 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:437
of the essential facility. The Commission may insist on offers,
notjust arguments, from both sides, but will not normally fix the
terms of the contract itself. Although the Commission cannot
delegate its power to rule on antitrust law questions to anyone,
arbitration may be a useful way of setting the terms of agree-
ments, resolving technical issues, or the trivial cases of discrimi-
nation that are likely to arise in day-to-day operations. Some so-
lution to these problems may be needed. The two Holyhead 217
cases illustrate the difficulty of trying to solve practical difficul-
ties with very general legal rules when the parties are reluctant to
reach agreement.
In essential facilities cases, complainants usually need to
make a contract with the dominant owner of the facility. They
therefore do not wish to spoil the atmosphere by making an un-
successful complaint. For this reason, the Commission has been
willing to discuss potential complaints with complainants, even
on an anonymous basis, to help the complainants assess whether
the chances of success were good enough to justify making the
complaint. It would be an abuse if a dominant company took
action against a complainant because it had made a com-
plaint,2 18 but complainants are well aware that in such situations
it would be very difficult to prove that the dominant company's
action was intended as a reprisal.
0. Discrimination in Day-To-Day Operations
The duty to provide access to an essential facility on a non-
discriminatory basis in all respects makes it inevitable that in
practice there may be arguments about whether the dominant
company, which of course retains general control over the oper-
ation of the facility, has discriminated in day-to-day operations.
This is one of the administrative costs of the principle. Factual
disputes of this kind are more suited to national courts than to
the Commission, because, among other reasons, the Commis-
sion has no power to award compensation. The Commission is
reluctant to become involved in essentially minor disputes over
day-to-day operations, if no question of principle is involved.
217. Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, OJ. L 15/8 (1994); B&I (Eur. Comm'nJune
11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; see supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text
(discussing cases involving Holyhead Harbor).
218. Abuse of Dominant Positions, supra note 17, at 55-57.
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In some cases, the Commission has ensured that an arbitra-
tion system is set up to resolve this kind of case. This is particu-
larly desirable if minor factual disputes are likely to be primarily
over technical issues concerning the running of a railway, the
operation of a harbor, or other matters where a technically qual-
ified arbitrator could decide more quickly and satisfactorily than
a non-specialist judge or the Commission itself.
While such problems are unavoidable in Article 86 cases, in
Article 85 cases they could be avoided, if the Commission
thought it necessary to do so, by refusing authorization for the
joint venture operating the facility. The Commission may per-
haps find it necessary in the future to be stricter and to refuse
authorizations rather than allowing joint ventures and imposing
obligations of nondiscrimination. Behavioral obligations do not
necessarily provide satisfactory solutions in structural cases. This
kind of problem is likely to be even greater in practice if the
Commission has accepted an undertaking rather than imposing
a formal condition on the parties.
P. Duopolies and Joint Dominance
One of the few near-duopoly cases raising essential facilities
issues in Community antitrust law involved the two big European
computer reservation systems,219 each of which was jointly
owned by several European airlines that were users of both facili-
ties. In fact, this was really a case of two CRSs each having a
dominant position in part of the Community, rather than joint
dominance in a single market. Because some of the airlines
were dominant in their national markets, they each had duties
under both Articles 85 and 86 not to discriminate in favor of the
CRS in which they had shares. Enforcement of this duty was es-
sential in order to enable the two CRSs to compete in one an-
other's markets. Community legislation says that the duty may
be on the basis of reciprocity, that is, discrimination by one
jointly dominant company may relieve the other of its duty not
to discriminate against the first. The other duopoly cases were
the U.L small coal mines cases, described above. 22 0 The legal
duties of dominant buyers do not correspond precisely to those
219. Amadeus/Sabre, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIST REPORT
ON COMPETITION PouIcy 73-74 (1992); see Air Transport, supra note 117, at 317-22.
220. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing U.K. Small Mines case).
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of dominant suppliers of goods or services, so these cases are of
limited interest as precedents in this respect.2 '
Under Community law, joint dominance seems to exist
when there is little or no competition between oligopolists
(whether due to collusion or otherwise) and when the oligo-
polists together have large market shares and the same kinds of
advantages over their competitors as are required to show the
dominance of a single firm. Some language used by the Court
seems to suggest that collusion is necessary for joint dominance.
As this would mean that the words of Article 86 add nothing to
Article 85, it seems likely that when the Court needs to decide
the point it will conclude that if there is little or no competition
between the oligopolists, there can be joint dominance without
collusion. Ajointly held dominant position can be abused, con-
trary to Article 86, by one duopolist or oligopolist even if the
others have not acted unlawfully.222 Therefore, it would be un-
lawful for one jointly dominant company to unjustifiably refuse
access, even though, if one granted access the applicant would
not need to seek access from the others.
Q. Temporary Duties To Provide Access: Selective Refusal
In one case, British Midland v. Aer Lingus,223 the Commission
has taken the view that access to the dominant company's inter-
lining may be essential for a competitor at one time, such as
when first entering the market in question, but not necessarily
later, such as after it has had enough time to establish itself,
when it has invented or produced an alternative facility or had
time to reach the scale at which it should be able to pay for its
own facility. Denial of access to such a facility may be a crucial
barrier to entry at an early stage in a company's operations and a
lesser disadvantage at another time or in other circumstances.
This would make it necessary to distinguish between essen-
tial facilities that the competitor cannot be expected to provide
for itself even in the long-term (either because that is practically,
221. They are important in showing the Commission's opinion that there can be
joint dominance without collusion.
222. John Temple Lang, Trade Associations and Self Regulation, in 1984 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INsT. 605, 652-62 (Barry Hawk ed., 1984); Air Transport, supra note 117, at 360-
65.
223. Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 (1992); see supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Aer Lingus).
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physically, or economically impossible, in the case of, for exam-
ple, another harbor, or because the facility is merely a prerequi-
site and not a way in which the competitor could compete bet-
ter) and facilities that the competitor should itself be expected
to provide in due course. This distinction may depend on the
economies of scale involved in providing an alternative facility,
or whether a second facility would create real competition be-
tween the two facilities themselves, or whether there would be
non-competition objections, such as environmental concerns, to
having a second facility. If the necessary investment changes
substantially, the legal position might change too.
If the competitor should be expected to provide a second
facility, it may be necessary to decide how much time it should
be given in which to do so. It would not be appropriate to
merely wait until it was accomplished. All this would inevitably
involve difficult policy questions about what kind of competition
to encourage, which are not answered by traditional static eco-
nomic analysis of essential facility cases. In effect, it has to be
decided whether the provision of an essential facility is a barrier
to entry that the competitor must itself surmount from the be-
ginning, or whether it should be helped, temporarily or perma-
nently, to surmount.
Two of the cases decided by the Commission are in this
"temporary duty" category. In British Midland v. Aer Lingus,
2 24
the Commission ruled that there was a duty to interline which
lasted for several years after British Midland came on a particu-
lar air route. The duty, however, was not permanent because
any such competitor could be expected to increase its own fre-
quency of flights in due course. It was important that interlining
is general industry practice as a result of arrangements between
competitors, and that Aer Lingus had refused to interline when
British Midland, which it regarded as an effective competitor,
had attained an important route. In B&I v. Sealink,225 the Com-
mission, in an interim measures decision, ruled that Sealink had
a duty as a dominant harbor operator to refrain from altering its
own car ferry schedules in a manner that would interfere with
224. Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 (1992); see supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Aer Lingus).
225. (Eur. Comm'nJune 11, 1992), cited in [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; see supra notes
81-89 and accompanying text (discussing B&I).
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the operations of a competing ferry operator. This duty was tem-
porary, to last until modifications had been made to B&I's ship
and to the quay in order to avoid the interference, after which
the problem would disappear. 226
The B&I decision was an interim measures decision con-
cerned with a temporary situation. Implications of the tempo-
rary nature of the duty described in the Aer Lingu 22 7 decision
are more difficult to foresee. Probably a new entrant is entitled
to obtain from dominant companies the type of interlining
agreement that is normal within the industry. Dominant enter-
prises are clearly not free to refuse normal interlining arrange-
ments to discourage or handicap companies that are likely to be
aggressive competitors. Interlining is always for the benefit of
passengers. Common sense says that frequent flights are some-
thing that each airline should try to provide for itself. When it
has done so, it will have the bargaining power to negotiate a new
interlining agreement. The fact that an incumbent airline has
many flights is not a barrier to entry, but rather a sign of effi-
ciency.
Perhaps temporary duties to provide access to facilities arise
only when a dominant enterprise has refused normal industry
arrangements selectively in order to handicap or to discourage
an active competitor. In other situations, the right to access lasts
as long as the dominance, accords to multilateral arrangements,
or does not exist. The Commission in the Aer Lingus decision
mentioned the possibility that the duty to interline might con-
tinue, but did not discuss how far companies are free to refuse
access to facilities based on multilateral arrangements.
R. Selective Refusal of Access to Discourage Aggressive Competition
As the Aer Lingus221 and United Brands229 cases show, if the
dominant company discriminates against a particular competitor
or if it artificially or without objective reasons230 denies a particu-
lar competitor an advantage that it was giving or could be ex-
226. B&I (Eur. Comm'nJune 11, 1992), [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 255.
227. Aer Lingus, O.J. L 96/34 (1992).
228. Id.
229. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207 [1978) 1
C.M.L.R. 429; see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing United Brands).
230. An example of a nonobjective reason would be to avoid aiding a vigorous
competitor.
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pected to give to others (especially if it is acting contrary to in-
dustry practice), this may be unlawful. In other words, a domi-
nant company may retain a facility that it has lawfully obtained,
but it should not be allowed to use it selectively to handicap or to
injure a particular competitor, because such use is anticompeti-
tive and is not simply a natural consequence of having obtained
an advantage or of owning an important facility. Therefore, if
the dominant company tries to deny access to a facility as a
means of putting pressure on a competitor to compete less vigor-
ously, it is likely to commit an abuse even if the facility is not
essential. Where the reason for the denial of access is anticom-
petitive, this is an unlawful effort by economic pressure to inhibit
or to discourage a competitor.
A second difference between these and normal essential fa-
cility cases is that in cases involving selective refusal of access, any
special characteristics of the victim are relevant, at least if they
are known or are likely to be known to the dominant company,
because they show how likely it is to be discouraged from enter-
ing the market, from competing vigorously, or to be forced out
of the market entirely.
S. Article 85 of the EC Treaty
Multi-company andjoint venture cases under Article 85 con-
stitute a third category, after essential facility and selective re-
fusal cases. In joint venture cases, the Commission may impose
an obligation on the parents to refrain from discriminating in
favor of their joint venture if the existence of the joint venture
would otherwise mean that the parents would deal in the goods
or services in question only with the joint venture, or if the exist-
ence or operations of the joint venture would otherwise impose
a serious handicap on competitors excluded from access to it.
The duty may be imposed on parents if they have large, but not
necessarily dominant, market shares, and even if they are not
controlling an essential facility in the strict sense. The duty not
to discriminate is similar to that in Article 86 cases, but it arises
under Article 85(3) in a wider range of situations. The DHL/
Lufthansa case, IGR Stereo Television,23 1 and computer reservation
231. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEV-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION Poucv 63-64 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing IGR).
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systems group exemptions23 2 are examples of this result of Arti-
cle 85. The result is therefore similar whether the case is ana-
lyzed under Article 85 or Article 86, although it is easier to justify
an obligation to grant access under Article 85.
Yet another category of cases are those in which exclusive
supply contracts that would normally be permissible are unlawful
because they tie up too many of the available outlets. The
Langnese and Sch'ller23 cases are recent examples of this.
Under Article 85, it may be useful in analysis to distinguish
between five types of cases: (1) those in which cooperation be-
tween competitors is essential to carry out the operations in
question, such as banks' arrangements for clearing checks, air-
lines' arrangements to interline (mutual horizontal coopera-
tion); (2) cases in which the joint venture owning the essential
facility is essentially in a dominant position, and the fact that the
downstream users are also its shareholders does not significantly
affect the position;23 4 (3) cases in which an essential facility has
been developed by a company for its own use, and later shared
with other companies as owners and not merely as users; (4)
those cases in which the cooperation is essential to provide some
service for all the participants for reasons such as the impossibil-
ity of otherwise achieving the necessary economies of scale;23 5
and (5) cases in which the facility (ice cream cabinets, petrol
pumps, etc.) are provided by one party to be used exclusively for
the sale of its products. Such an agreement gives rise to the
problems discussed here only if other suppliers cannot in prac-
tice provide their own facilities.
When the Commission imposes a condition of nondiscrimi-
natory behavior in an individual exemption under Article 85(3),
it exercises a wider discretion than when it insists on nondiscrim-
232. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing CRSs).
233. Langnese, O.J. L 183/19 (1993); Sch~ller, O.J. L 183/1 (1993).
234. See, e.g., IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrTIES,
ELEENTH REPORT ON COMPETrrION Poucy 63-64 (1982); see also supra notes 111-16 (dis-
cussing IGR). These are analogous to the cases in which U.S. courts have accepted the
physical inevitability of a "bottleneck."
235. Performing rights societies are an example of this type of case. See, e.g.,
GEMA I, Case 45/71 R, [1971] E.C.R1 791; see also supra note 143 and accompanying
text (discussing performing rights society cases). The third type of case above can de-
velop into this situation. These are analogous to the cases in which U.S. courts have
accepted the benefits of cooperation. In cases of this kind the benefits usually increase
as the number of participants increases.
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inatory behavior under Article 86. Nevertheless, there is a need
to reconcile the three policy objectives of: first, ensuring access
to essential services for other competition; second, not unduly
limiting the advantages of ownership or other advantages sought
by the parties; and third, minimizing administrative costs. One
difference is that under Article 85236 the Commission can, if ap-
propriate, clearly impose an obligation to submit day-to-day dis-
crimination issues to arbitration. More important distinctions
are that Article 85 applies if the parties have sufficiently large
market shares, even if they fall short of dominance, and that it is
administratively simpler to require an outsider to be licensed or
otherwise given access on the same terms as existing members
than to draw up the terms for a kind of contract not previously
made.
T. Horizontally-Integrated Dominant Companies
Horizontally-integrated companies are companies that sup-
ply two or more products or services that have to be bought or
used together by their customers. The horizontally integrated
company may be dominant in the market for one or both of the
products or services. Antitrust law issues may arise in such situa-
tions if it has competitors that sell one product or service that
needs to be used with the other product or service of the domi-
nant company. For them, access for themselves or for their cus-
tomers to the product or service of the dominant company can
raise issues that are at least similar to essential facility issues. The
dominant company may try to make its products incompatible
with those of its competitors, or may try by other means to pre-
vent its customers from using its competitors' products with its
products.
These cases include: (a) companies that sell equipment in
modules, selling both components and complete products; (b)
companies selling computers, software and peripherals, sound
reproducing equipment and tapes, videos and cassettes, cameras
and films, radio transmitting, and receiving equipment; (c)
companies selling equipment and the consumables to be used
with it.
The first principle in connection with horizontally inte-
grated dominant companies is that they may not tie in unrelated
236. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
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products. Article 86 prohibits this.3 7 It does so, it has been sug-
gested above, because tying-in is an effort to use power in the
market to strengthen the company's position in other markets.
In effect, this is the two market or leverage argument, which,
insofar as it is valid, may also apply when the two products,
though in separate markets, need to be used together. It is only
when two products must be used together that the argument can
be made that one is an essential facility for the use or sale of the
other.
For products that need to be used together, the basic rules
are the same as those discussed already. The dominant company
has a duty to supply the competitor or its customers and cannot
refuse without specific technical or other justification to supply a
user who chooses to combine its competitors' product with its
own. The dominant company has also a duty to not discriminate
against users who choose to combine products, or to make diffi-
culties for its competitors, such as by refusing its competitors
compulsory licenses or altering the interfaces of its products
without improving them. The Hilt 238 and Decca2 9 cases are au-
thorities for these rules.
Even if the company is dominant in the supply of both prod-
ucts, it is always free to improve either or both of them. If it
improves product A, and as an incidental and necessary result
product A becomes incompatible with all previous versions of
product B, the company will modify its product B to make it
compatible. When this has been done, even if B has not other-
wise been modified, B (as well as A) has a new advantage over
the competitors' versions of B, merely because it works with the
new improved version of A. This advantage is legitimate, even if
the company is dominant in the supply of both products. How-
237. Id. art. 86.
238. Hilti AG v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4
C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. First Instance); see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Hilti).
239. Commission Decision No. 89/113/EEC, O.J. L 43/27 (1989) [hereinafter
Decca]. In the Decca case, the Commission found that Decca had deliberately changed
the signals transmitted by its navigation equipment so that they could not be properly
received by non-Decca receivers. Id. 1 108, O.J. L 43/27, at 43 (1989). It took two
months to modify the software of the competitors' receivers to make them fully compat-
ible with the altered Decca signals. Id. 1 110, OJ. L 43/27, at 43 (1989). Decca's
exclusionary behavior denied users of non-Decca receivers proper access to Decca's
navigation signals (the essential facility). This infringed Article 86.
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ever, the dominant company may not otherwise put a user who
chooses to combine its product with its competitors in a less sat-
isfactory position than if the user used both of its products.
The main problem arises over disclosure of interface infor-
mation. As already mentioned, in the absence of exclusionary
product innovation or design, it is not normally necessary for a
dominant company to give its competitors information about its
forthcoming products, even if its competitors' products may
have to be used with them. However, in the IBM 4' case, IBM
was able to take orders for its new products before the detailed
information about their technical characteristics, which its com-
petitors required, became available. Competitors needed this in-
formation to adapt their products to make them fully compatible
with IBM's new products. 41 IBM thus could foreclose the mar-
ket before the competitors could begin to adapt their products.
The Commission considered that IBM should disclose interface
information when it announced its new products and began to
take orders for them. As no decision was ever adopted in the
Commission's IBM case, it is not possible to say how the Commis-
sion would finally have balanced the welfare losses resulting
from IBM's conduct against the welfare losses resulting from
eliminating part of the advantages of innovation, and the admin-
istrative costs of a legal rule requiring disclosure. Nor did the
Commission explicitly choose the essential facility theory as the
basis of a final position, although that seems to be one of the
best rationales for the view that it took. Assuming that IBM was
dominant, IBM's control over its own system gave it a duty to do
what was needed to enable competitors to compete within that
system by offering IBM-compatible products. Access to interface
information was essential for this purpose. At the time, it was
not economically feasible for any competitor to compete with
IBM in providing whole systems, and the Commission's view was
that disclosure of interface information would not have unrea-
sonably disclosed the non-interface characteristics of IBM's new
products.
The second possible rationale for the Commission's posi-
tion in the IBM case is the rule that a company dominant in one
240. IBM, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635; see supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text (discussing IBM).
241. Id. at 2642, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 637.
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market may not use its position there to exclude competitors
from a second related market. This rule is well established in EC
case law, but whether it could be said that IBM had used its posi-
tion in one market to exclude competitors from the other is less
clear. It will be seen that horizontally-integrated dominant com-
panies are able in effect to deny access to an essential facility in
the course of their relations with their customers, and that they
need not have contractual arrangements with their competitors
in order to provide access to essential facilities if they are willing
or are obliged to do so.
U. Possible Justications for Discrimination or Refusal of Access to
Essential Facilities
The case law summarized above has done little to clarify the
circumstances in which discrimination or a refusal can be justi-
fied. However, the Commission has never said anything to sug-
gest that a dominant company could not take advantage of genu-
ine advantages of vertical integration either to give itself an ad-
vantage over its downstream competitor or to argue that it was
not obliged to give the competitor access because the result
would be worse for consumer welfare rather than better. A dom-
inant company never has a duty to offset a competitive advantage
that it has lawfully obtained, although it cannot use exclusive ac-
cess to an essential facility to obtain such an advantage. There
are probably not very many cases in which such advantages of
vertical integration could be shown.
However, in one such case, details of which cannot be pub-
lished at present, the Commission informally took the position
that the dominant owner of an essential facility could not be crit-
icized for taking advantage of economies of scale in construction
of several new facilities (if they were available only to it) and
refusing to allow a downstream competitor to develop a single
facility for itself on the dominant company's land. The Court's
decision in Hugin,2 4 2 a case involving the supply of spare parts,
may perhaps indicate a reluctance to prevent a company from
trying to maintain its reputation and goodwill by having its prod-
ucts serviced only by companies whose employees it had trained.
242. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Hugin).
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In the IBM 245 case, the Commission seems to have been sympa-
thetic to the argument that compulsory disclosure of interfaces
would be inappropriate if it would disclose new features of IBM's
designs.
In other cases, it would certainly be a defense in a refusal of
access case that the proposed use is inconsistent with the safety
or technical standards of the facility or would otherwise interfere
with its proper use, or would interfere with the efficient use of
the facility by the existing users. If the use of the facility by a new
entrant would genuinely cause serious congestion, access can be
refused temporarily. If this occurred, the question whether the
available places should then be'auctioned or otherwise reallo-
cated would arise. In the Port of Rdby244 decision, the Commis-
sion rejected, on the facts, the argument that giving access to a
new entrant would prevent the existing users from expanding
their activities, but in any case they have no guaranteed right to
do so unless their usage contracts provide for expansion. Such
provision might, if it was unreasonably broad or for too long a
period, be contrary to Article 85 as exclusionary. In the Port of
Rodby decision, the Commission also rejected the argument that
competition would not be increased by the new entrant because
the existing port could not handle more ship movements. The
Commission stated that even if that were true, competition in
quality of service would be possible.
V. Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights
An economics-based approach is also appropriate to the
question of when a dominant company is obliged to grant
licenses of intellectual property rights to competitors. A domi-
nant company is normally free to acquire and retain for its own
exclusive use intellectual property rights that give it advantages.
However, if the rights in question give control of something
without which competitors are not able to compete at all, there
can be a duty to license. The right is an essential facility. This is
true only if the license is essential to produce any goods to com-
pete in a whole market. An intellectual property right does not
243. IBM, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635; see supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text (discussing IBM).
244. Port of Rodby, OJ. L 55/52 (1994); see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text (discussing Port of Rodby).
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normally or necessarily create a monopoly in a whole product
market. Licenses in general need not be given merely to pro-
duce aispecific design of goods, such as components that would
otherwise infringe the dominant company's designs, copymark,
or trademark rights. If licenses are needed only for such pur-
poses, there is a duty to license only if there is some related ex-
ploitative or exclusionary behavior in addition to the refusal to
license, and for which the granting of a license is an appropriate
competition law remedy. In fact, the law will be unclear until
the Court gives judgment in RTE/Magill, and the following com-
ments can only be tentative. No doubt the final result of the
RTE/Magill case will considerably clarify the law.
A detailed analysis of the long opinion of the Advocate Gen-
eral in RTE would not be appropriate here, but some points can
be made. A monopoly that results from an intellectual property
right, a monopoly given by statute, and a monopoly due to the
acquisition or construction of an essential facility may perhaps
have different consequences under Community antitrust law,
but they are all monopolies given, or protected, by law. There
should be clear reasons for distinguishing between them. The
Advocate General said that
[a] specific exercise of rights which in principle are within
the specific subject-matter may be incompatible with Article
86 .... The third example in Volvo v. Veng [ceasing to make
spare parts for models still in use, which the Court said was an
abuse] shows that the Court has accepted that it is possible
pursuant to Article 86 to interfere with rights falling within
the specific subject-matter of an intellectual property right.245
A duty to give access to an asset of any kind that constitutes
an essential facility is always an interference with the ownership
of that facility which needs to be, but which of course sometimes
can be, justified under antitrust law. The only question is, there-
fore, whether the circumstances of the RTE/Magill case made it
appropriate to order licensing.
If Magill had claimed a right to obtain only RTE's programs
in advance for a week at a time, so as to set up a magazine merely
in competition with RTE's magazine, it would not have been of-
245. Opinion of Advocate General Gulman, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission,
Joined Cases C-24142/91 P, 52-58, 11 18-20 (Eur. Ct.J. June 1, 1994) (Court decision
not yet issued).
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fering a wholly new product, and its case would have been much
weaker. The stronger argument was that Magill, by combining
the programs of BBC and RTE, was offering a new product. The
new product to be offered by Magill, however, was essentially
program lists of several TV stations put together. It was appar-
ently not a market distinct from the separate program guides
that already existed. If Magill had a right to obtain program lists
from either BBC or RTE, it would follow that BBC could have
obliged RTE to disclose its programs to enable the BBC to pro-
duce a comprehensive TV guide, and that RTE could have ob-
tained BBC's programs for the same purpose. If either had
done so, Magill's product would not have been a new product.
The Advocate General accepted that it is an abuse if the
copyright owner refuses a license for a product that does not
compete with his product, i.e., which is in another market, but,
the Advocate General gave no reasons. This is essentially the
third kind of situation visualized in Veng v. Volvo.
246
Thus, there are several situations. First, the plaintiff's prod-
uct would compete with the owner's product in that product's
own market (which may be the Magill situation).247 Second, the
plaintiff's product is in a separate market where the owner has
no product, in which case refusal to license is unjustifiable, and
an abuse, if there is a sufficient effect on competition. The third
situation is one in which the plaintiff's product would compete
with the owner's product, but in a downstream or related market
and not in the primary market in which the copyright or other
protected goods are sold. So, for example, if a company sought
to preserve a monopoly in the market for servicing and mainte-
nance of its product by refusing to supply spare parts for use by
competing service companies, this would be an abuse, if the ef-
fect on competition was sufficiently great.
On this view, therefore, the main question is not primarily
whether the plaintiff's product or service is new, but rather
whether it is in a product or service market distinct from, though
related to, the market in which the intellectual right primarily
operates. More precisely, the plaintiff, needs to show that it
wishes to launch a product or a service for which a supply of the
246. Volvo AB v. ErikVeng (U.I.) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122; see supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Veng).
247. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text (discussing RTE).
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owner's goods or services are necessary, but that its product or
service is not merely the kind of product or service protected by
the right. If the plaintiff is in a position to show this, then it can
rely on the principle that a dominant company cannot use its
position in one market to restrict competition or give itself ad-
vantages in another. This principle applies if the goods or serv-
ices offered in the second market are not covered by the intellec-
tual property rights of the company that is dominant in the first
market.
What if the products in the second market are partly cov-
ered by the intellectual property right? The Advocate General
considered that the crucial test is whether the plaintiff needs a
license of the intellectual property right to enter the second
market. If it does, then the Advocate General said that the exist-
ence of a separate market is irrelevant. In effect, on this view the
owner of an intellectual property right is free to use all the lever-
age that it can exercise, irrespective of the effects of its refusal to license
on competition in the second market. On this point, the conclusions
of the Advocate General are open to question. If Article 86, as it
clearly does, allows compulsory licensing of intellectual property
rights on nondiscriminatory terms in order to end discrimina-
tion between licensees (an anticompetitive or exclusionary
abuse), it is hard to see why compulsory licensing would never
be justified when refusal to license means that all competitors
are excluded from the downstream market, so that the effect on
competition is even greater.
Analysis of the third situation envisaged in the Veng v.
Volvo 248 judgment leads to the same conclusion. It is an abuse if
a dominant company refuses both to make and to license pro-
duction of goods or services that are needed. This is an abuse
because it denies consumers access to something that they could
usefully be offered. However, there is always some reason why a
company refuses to grant a license that would generate royalties.
If a licensee would not be competing with the existing products
of the owner of the intellectual property right, the reason will
usually be that the owner either wishes to force users to abandon
its old product and buy its new one (and so ceases to produce
spare parts for the old product), or that it is thinking about pro-
248. Veng, [1988] E.C.R. at 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R at 122; see supra note 28 and
accompanying text (discussing Veng).
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ducing a new product and does not wish to complicate the prod-
uct launch. If compulsory licensing is justified under Article 86
in such circumstances, as the Court has said and as the Advocate
General accepts, it is hard to see why compulsory licensing could
never be justified when the plaintiff's product competes with the
owners, if the effect on competition of the refusal to license is serious
enough.
Based on the Advocate General's view, it looks as if there
would be scope for manipulation of the two markets by a domi-
nant company, if it was able to introduce any device subject to
intellectual property rights into an essential facility. The IBM
2 49
and Decca250 cases are probably situations in which, if a dominant
company had no duty to license intellectual property rights, the
companies could have made use of that fact to monopolize the
related markets. Other cases can be imagined.
If the Advocate General is correct, it would follow that the
legal result would be radically different depending on whether
Article 85 or Article 86 applies. Nothing that the Advocate Gen-
eral has said would suggest that compulsory licensing could not
be ordered in situations involving a patent pool or any other ar-
rangement under Article 85, in cases such as IGR Stereo Televi-
sion.251 The Court, however, said in Continental Can that Articles
85 and 86 should be applied consistently with one another.252
When is ordering a compulsory license an appropriate rem-
edy? At first sight, a remedy ought to fit the abuse as well as
possible. If refusing a license is not an abuse, a compulsory li-
cense is prima facie not the right remedy. On this basis, the
remedy should be to order the dominant company to end the
additional exploitative or exclusionary behavior that makes the
refusal to license unlawful. This theory is not necessarily correct
for a number of reasons. It treats the two kinds of behavior as if
they were unconnected, which is wrong. There are situations in
249. IBM, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R- 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635; see supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text (discussing BM).
250. Decca, OJ. L 43/27 (1989); see supra note 239 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Decca).
251. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrriEs, ELEv-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLicy 63-64 (1982); see supra notes 111-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing IGR).
252. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R 215, [1973]
C.M.L.PL 199.
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which the refusal to license either increases the seriousness of
the other behavior or makes it possible.
The theory is an inadequate solution because, frequently,
only granting a compulsory license will create competition and
ensure that the abuse is less likely to be committed again. Limit-
ing the remedy to the precise abuse committed means that the
competition authorities must be ready to prohibit other or re-
peated abuses if they occur. Ordering the granting of a license
is a market solution, not a bureaucratic one. Remedies ought to
provide long-term and effective solutions, not merely short term
and partial ones.
In many cases, the combination of the abuse and refusal to
license unlawfully strengthens the position of the dominant
company in a way that will not be corrected merely by ordering
an end to the current abuse and by paying the competitors dam-
ages. A dominant company should not be allowed to keep an
advantage that it has unlawfully obtained, as the Commission
ruled in the Irish Distillers"'3 case. In some circumstances, only a
compulsory license will take away this advantage. The number
of licenses, and their terms, could if necessary be adjusted to
achieve this as precisely as circumstances would permit.
Compulsory licenses would be especially appropriate when
the dominant company attempts to use the intellectual property
right to restrict competition in a second related market, separate
from that in which it is dominant. In most cases, the second
market would be the market in which the abuse would be com-
mitted. If the intellectual property right was not inherently in-
tended to create a monopoly in the second market,25 4 a compul-
sory license would probably be appropriate.
It seems to be generally accepted that compulsory licensing
is appropriate under Article 85 if a patent pool or other restric-
tive arrangement would otherwise create "second class citizens."
The economic result, however, should, as far as possible, be the
same under Articles 85 and 86. Of course, competition law does
not authorize the authorities to put an end to dominance, but
only to abuses. However, the license should not seek to end the
253. Irish Distillers Group, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUmrrIs, EIHT-
EENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLicy 85 (1989).
254. An example is when copyright in TV programs was used to restrict competi-
tion in the market for TV magazines.
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dominance, but merely to create some competition in the mar-
ket other than that in respect of which the intellectual property
right originated. The dominance may not be (and in most cases
is not) due to the intellectual property right, even if the domi-
nance exists in the market to which that right primarily relates.
Thus, a license will not put an end to the dominance.
It may also be contended that compulsory licenses put an
end to the monopoly conferred by the intellectual property
right. This is the reason why licenses are ordered only if there is
some related abuse other than mere refusal to license. Also,
licenses would not be ordered generally to all competitors. They
would be given only as far as the circumstances made them nec-
essary - for exmple, only insofar as was needed to create com-
petition in the second market.
W. Cross-Subsidizing.
Community law has not yet fully answered the question of
when a dominant company is allowed to charge low prices for
the products for which there is competition, and high prices for
the products for which there is none. Cross-subsidizing, without
more, is legal in itself, so the behavior can normally be unlawful
only because the low price is exclusionary (i.e., below cost) or
the high price is exploitative. This is true whether or not the
products need to be used in combination. Cross-subsidizing,
however, is probably often associated with monopoly pricing or
with predatory pricing, or both. Also, cross-subsidizing can be
an abuse in itself. In the Port of Genova255 case, the Court said
that certain companies with exclusive rights were led, by that
fact, either to require payment for services that were not re-
quired, to charge excessive prices, to refuse to use modem tech-
nology, or to extend price reductions to some users offsetting
these reductions by an increase of the prices charged to other
users.2 56 The Court clearly regarded all these kinds of behavior
as equally capable of being unlawful under Article 86, though
the Court did not find it necessary to say precisely in what cir-
cumstances they would be unlawful.
Although the Court did not say so, if a dominant company
255. Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA, Case
C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R1 1-5889.
256. Id. at 1-5929.
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cross-subsidized selective price cuts targeting a particular com-
petitor, that might be unlawful if it was objectively likely that the
competitor would be forced out of the market, or if there were
circumstances that indicated that the price cuts were intended to
warn the competitor off and, therefore, discourage aggressive
competition. The key issue seems to be whether the dominant
company's action is a rational competitive response or goes fur-
ther than is likely to be profitable and amounts to a demonstra-
tion of the dominant company's determination to ensure that
the new competitor cannot establish itself. The difficulties of
distinguishing satisfactorily between legitimate and improper
competition are obvious.
If a dominant company consistently lowered its prices in re-
sponse to new market entrants and maintained them at low
levels until the competitors had been forced out, even if the
prices were not predatory in themselves, the effect might be ex-
clusionary by creating a barrier to entry. It is true that the domi-
nant company's costs and those of its competitors would not nec-
essarily be the same, and a dominant company usually has
greater scope for cross-subsidizing than non-dominant compa-
nies have. As suggested above, the tests are objective. Would the
dominant company's behavior be likely to make the competi-
tor's activities uneconomical? Is the dominant company selec-
tively targeting a particular competitor because it is a new en-
trant and thereby perhaps warning off another potential entrant,
or because it is particularly competitive? Selective price reduc-
tions are probably not prohibited under Article 86257 unless they
are below cost. Dominant incumbents can usually afford to op-
erate at or near cost longer than new entrants.
A specific, if extreme, example of selective pricing arises
with what are known as "fighting ships." Maritime line confer-
ences are price-fixing agreements that also organize their mem-
bers' sailing dates. When faced with competition from non-
members, conferences have arranged for special ships to sail at
the same time as the non-member's ship and to offer extremely
low freight rates, well below normal conference rates, which
tend to be high. This is contrary to Article 86, because it is in-
tended to squeeze out or frighten off competition, as well as con-
257. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
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trary to Article 85.258
Under Community competition law, "unfairly" high super-
competitive profits are prohibited by Article 86, and customers
forced to pay them can claim compensation. If such profits are
used to cross-subsidize predatory prices, competitors can also
claim compensation. The amount of the compensation would
be different for each category of plaintiff, of course, but the cost
to the dominant company might be considerable.
X. U.S. Law and the Views of Professor Areeda
It would be an impossibly long task to compare fully the
Community law discussed here with the U.S. law, but it is worth-
while to look at the Community law in the light of the views of
Professor Areeda. In a recent paper he made several points
which are relevant to this Article. He said about multi-company
cases under U.S. law:
(1) whenever competitors jointly create a useful facility, (2)
that is essential to the competitive vitality of rivals, (3) and (per-
haps) essential to the competitive vitality of the market, (4) and
the admission of rivals is consistent with the legitimate purposes
of the venture, then (5) the collaborators must admit rivals
on relatively equal terms.
2 159
Areeda points out that the words in italics are imprecise.
Making allowance for this fact, there is no obvious reason to see
a difference between U.S. law and Community law in multi-firm
cases. He rightly observes that some U.S. unilateral refusal cases
have gone much further than genuine monopoly situations.
The Community unilateral refusal cases have certainly not gone
so far, and seem unlikely to do so.
He suggests that in U.S. law under Section 2 "[t]here is no
general duty to share. Compulsory access, if it exists at all, is and
should be exceptional." 260 This is not the approach of the Court
under Community law. The Court clearly considers that there is
often a duty to supply. This is no doubt very important in the-
258. Commission Decision No. 93/82/EEC, O.J. L 34/20, at 33-34, 11 73-83
(1993).
259. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANsrrtisT LJ. 841,844 (1989) (emphasis added) (discussing Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)); see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompeti-
tive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986).
260. Areeda, supra note 259, at 852; see 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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ory. It remains to be seen how much difference it makes in prac-
tice.
Areeda suggests that "[a] single firm's facility, as distinct
from that of a combination, is 'essential' only when it is both
critical to the plaintiff's competitive vitality and the plaintiff is
essential for competition in the marketplace." 261 The Commu-
nity law definition of what is "essential" is narrower, if it is cor-
rectly stated above.
Community law has not explicitly said that the plaintiff must
be essential for competition. However, much the same result
has probably been reached by saying that access to a facility may
be required only if the effects described above would otherwise
result not for the plaintiff in particular, but for competitors in
general, and that access will not be ordered if there is already
effective competition in the market. Areeda says that even when
all the other conditions are satisfied, legitimate business purpose
always saves the defendant. This is certainly true in Community
law, although there is relatively little case law on what constitutes
legitimate business justification.
The defendant's intent is seldom illuminating. Rather, ac-
cording to Areeda, it is always to avoid helping a competitor.
The Community law is the same on this point. Abuse under Arti-
cle 86 is normally objective and intent is irrelevant. A duty to
deal that cannot be adequately and reasonably supervised,
Areeda says, should not be imposed. The Commission is aware
of this requirement, but has so far not had to deal with an
acutely difficult case.
Areeda also said:
No one should be forced to deal unless doing so is likely sub-
stantially to improve competition in the marketplace by re-
ducing price or by increasing output or innovation. Such an
improvement is unlikely (a) when it would chill desirable ac-
tivity; (b) the plaintiff is not an actual or potential competi-
tor; (c) when the plaintiff merely substitutes itself for the mo-
nopolist or shares the monopolist's gains; or (d) when the
monopolist already has the usual privilege of charging the
monopoly price for its resources.2 62
By way of explanation for the last point, he said that a mo-
261. Areeda, supra note 259, at 852.
262. Id.
ESSENTIAL FAC-L1TIES
nopoly newspaper in town can charge the monopoly price
whether or not another distributes it.
These points all require discussion. Obliging the owner of a
facility to grant access to it, against its will, always runs some risk
of reducing the value of legitimately acquired assets. The ability
to retain such assets is pro-competitive. Areeda's test is therefore
too vague and, as stated, goes too far. His second case, under
Community law, would not normally give rise to any duty on the
dominant company to supply. In the third case, there is no ben-
efit to competition and Community law would probably not re-
quire access to be given, although no such case seems to have
arisen. The fourth case seems over-simplified, at least with re-
spect to service markets. A port owner that used the port for
ferry operations could, if the port was a monopoly, charge mo-
nopoly price harbor dues, which would have to be passed on by
ferry operators. There would still, however, be more competi-
tion in the ferry business if another ferry company was allowed
to use the port.
The key issue seems to be one not raised by Areeda, except
implicitly the issue of how important competition is in the down-
stream market for the price or the bargain obtained by consum-
ers. If the downstream market is the local distribution of news-
papers and distributors are paid out of the price shown on the
newspaper, cost savings at the distribution level, which would
probably be small anyway, will not be passed on to consumers.
However, it would be quite different if the profit margins of the
downstream competitors were a sufficiently large proportion of
the total price paid by consumers to make it worthwhile to pro-
mote competition in the downstream market.
CONCLUSION
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this Article. In
Community law, there is a broad general principle that compa-
nies in dominant positions must not refuse to supply their goods
or services if refusal to supply would have a significant effect on
competition. This principle applies to both customers and com-
petitors. Though neither the scope or the exceptions to this
principle have been fully clarified yet, it initially made it unnec-
essary to develop a special category for essential facilities cases.
In situations in which access to a facility is essential, the
1994]
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Commission has now recognized that a strict rule is necessary,
requiring supply on nondiscriminatory terms to competitors.
Where this rule applies, there will be few exceptions. Because
this rule requires close relations between competitors, due to its
administrative costs and the risk of discouraging legitimate com-
petition, the terms of this rule and the exceptions to it need to
be clarified as much as possible. This can be done only by case
law and analysis. There is a duty to provide access to essential
facilities if the effect of refusal to supply on competition is seri-
ous enough, notably where there is little competition in the
downstream market. Prohibitions on discriminatory behavior in
day-to-day operations, under either Article 85 or Article 86,63
are likely to be troublesome to supervise. The Commission is
already taking steps to try to ensure that controversies are dealt
with by arbitration or otherwise without formal Commission ac-
tion.
Therefore, the key questions in determining whether there
is a duty to give access to facilities in single firm refusal cases are:
*is the facility created or established jointly by competitors or
unilaterally by a single dominant enterprise?
- is the facility one with unlimited capacity or, if not, does it
have unused or spare capacity?
how many competitors, if any, are there in the downstream
market, in addition to the company associated with the domi-
nant owner of the essential facility?
- does competition in the downstream market significantly af-
fect the price paid or the value for money obtained by the
buyer in the downstream market?
- what legitimate business justification is suggested for the re-
fusal to supply?
263. EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85-86.
